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The thesis argument is that in a democracy, the 
military is a valuable instrument in quelling domestic 
violence. The author attempts to prove that the military 
response is critical in dealing with civilian violence and 
approaches the issue of the legitimacy of this response. 
The author analyses the current status of civil-
military relations, the record of the military's employment 
in cases of civilian disturbances, as well as the legal 
framework governing this employment in both countries. 
The thesis uses the 1992 Los Angeles riots as a case 
study for the United States. For Romania, the 1989 
Revolution and the 1991 incidents are investigated with a 
view to determining Romanian particulars. 
In conclusion, the thesis compares the two cases to 
draw conclusions from the U.S. case appropriate to the 
Romanian one, and thus to improve the Romanian military 
response to civil violence. 
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The collapse of Central and East European Communist 
regimes in the wake of the Cold War has brought significant 
challenges to the security apparata in these countries. 
Romania is not an exception, moreover, due to the violent 
termination of Communist rule; the establishment of an 
executive agency to deal with civilian violence has met 
with several obstructions. 
The main argument of the thesis is that the employment 
of the military in quelling civilian disturbances is a 
legitimate and efficient approach in established 
democracies. Therefore, it is critical for a fledgling 
democracy like Romania to accept this approach for quelling 
domestic political violence. This is so because the absence 
of a determined response to civilian violence could 
jeopardize the stability of the democratic institutions and 
even the consolidation of democracy. 
The thesis will analyze the Romanian and the United 
States cases focusing on the employment of the military in 
the 1992 Los Angeles riots, and the 1989 Revolution and the 
xi 
1991 miners' riot in Romania. This thesis will also 
discuss: 
• Issues related to civilian control over the military, 
to discern if civilian supremacy is present and 
whether the military accepts the notion of domestic 
employment; 
• The legal framework governing this type of military 
mission; 
• The historical record. 
The thesis will argue for the adoption by the Romanian 
authorities of a coherent and comprehensive legal 
framework, including operational regulations, with a view 
to provide the grounds for a military response to civilian 
violence. The American approach, adapted to Romanian 
circumstances, provides a valuable model. 
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This thesis will examine the military responses to 
political and social violence in Romania. Subsequently, it 
will attempt to compare it with the use of the armed forces 
in the United States, in similar situations. 1 The underlying 
question is whether the use of the armed forces in cases of 
widespread violence is a makeshift expedient in transitional 
stages, or, in a mature democratic environment, an 
established instrument of state power. 
The thesis argues that the domestic employment of the 
armed forces has occurred frequently in a democratic society 
like the United States, that this type of mission is 
legitimate, feasible, and often critical to quelling 
civilian disturbances. The analysis will focus on the 
significance of the military response to civil violence for 
civil-military relations. 
1 The term 'similar' is used here as far as the outcome is 
concerned (i.e. widespread violence), and not necessarily the motivation 
behind these upheavals. 
1 
B. BACKGROUND 
The end of the Cold War brought the collapse of the 
totalitarian regimes imposed by the Soviet Union in Central 
and Eastern Europe. The nations in the region embarked upon 
a bold venture to build free market economies and to align 
their societies with Western liberal democratic values. So 
far, the consolidation of market economies has preceded the 
onset of stable democracy.2 
In Romania, the economic transition has affected the 
very fabric of society. The uprooting of the working class, 
the mainstay of society has not gone unchallenged. In 
specific cases, it was accompanied by outbursts of 
violence. 3 
After the imposition of Communist rule in Romania, the 
classic instruments of coercion (law enforcement agencies, 
security police) were shaped after the Soviet model. 
Following the collapse of Communist rule, the legitimacy of 
these instruments of coercion was challenged. These bodies 
2 Many academics actually consider a successful market economy as 
a sine qua non requirement for the sustainability of democratic 
institutions. See Robert E. Looney, Peter C. Frederiksen, George M. 
Warley, and Michael Schaub, ·Prerequisites for Successful Fiscal 
Reforms," in Journal of Public, Budgeting, Accounting, and Financial 
Management, 9 (4), pp. 617-626, and Robert J. Barro, "Democracy and 
Growth," Journal of Economic Growth, 1 (3), pp. 1-27. 
3 To a certain extent, all societal segments are affected, but in 
this specific case, the potential for violent collective action resides 
mainly with the most extensive and cohesive one, that is the industrial 
workers. 
2 
are undertaking a painful "democratization" process. This 
process bodes ill for the readiness of these forces in cases 
of large-scale outbreaks of violence. Since the classic 
instruments of coercion have been discredited and are in 
disarray, the most feasible response to the outbreak of 
violence is the employment of the armed forces, seen as a 
transient substitute. This approach raises different kinds 
of problems. 
First, the domestic use of the armed forces is not 
popular with the military, both in the light of the 1989 
Revolution, as well as due to the lack of a tradition of 
domestic employment. Second, the legal framework is far from 
being comprehensible or comprehensive; the sensitivity of 
this type of mission makes critical the completion of 
legislation covering the field. Third, the training of the 
Romanian officer corps was geared towards waging defensive 
wars; civil disturbances have only recently been accepted as 
a significant threat to national security. 
c. METHODOLOGY 
The thesis is a comparative case study of similar 
disturbances in two different nations. The comparative case 
falls along the lines of "small N, large n," that is, a 
small number of cases, with a large number of independent 
3 
variables. The independent variables to be investigated are 
the patterns of civilian control, the civic cultures, the 
record of armed forces employment in non-conventional 
missions, and ensuing influences upon the military 
establishment. The dependent variable is the success of the 
use of the armed forces in coping with large-scale 
violence. 4 
There are several reasons for comparing two cases 
seemingly sharing few features like the United States and 
Romania. First, the United States is widely regarded as the 
epi t'ome of liberal democracy, and this perception is quite 
standard in Romania. Second, the U.S. military has an 
extensive record of employment in civil disturbances. Third, 
during the process of alignment to NATO standards, the 
Romanian military has always attempted to emulate as closely 
as possible the U.S. model. It is therefore reasonable to 
assume that the Romanian military might adapt the U.S. 
experience in the field of military responses to civilian 
violence to Romanian conditions. 
4 Success denotes that military intervention is critical in ending 
the violence. Moreover, their employment in assisting law enforcement 
agencies should not be widely resented by significant segments of the 
popUlation, nor should it inflict adverse effects upon the military. 
4 
D. SIGNIFICANCE 
The study will try to shed light upon a contentious 
issue, i.e. the employment of the armed forces in military 
operations other than war, namely military support to civil 
authorities. By comparing a fledgling democracy and an 
established one, the thesis draws conclusions on the 
validity of military responses to civilian violence. Lessons 
derived from the u.s. case bear certain relevance to Romania 
as it attempts to develop an efficient approach to coping 
with this type of contingency. 
5 
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II. THE CURRENT STATUS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. BACKGROUND 
Any attempt to distinguish the universal from the 
specific in the case of u.s. civil-military relations should 
acknowledge the fact that their status is only a snapshot of 
overlapping cycles of evolution. 5 Furthermore, the 
determinants that lead to a specific configuration should be 
accounted for, in order to allow a cross-country comparison. 
This implies size and geography, historical evolution, 
population, economic development, technological level, 
changes in the international environment, and several other 
factors begetting influence upon the object of the present 
analysis. 
The current state of u.s. civil-military relations 
should not lea~t least, according to this student's 
opinion--to the conclusion that they are in a crisis. More 
likely, civil-military relations are confronted with 
5 Three schools of thought deem the entire social system as 
subject to cyclical changes: Cultural theorists ascribe political and 
social change to changes in the cultural realm, political historians and 
historical economists look for regular cycles of political and economic 
change, while social theorists credit changes in the state and 
7 
changing domestic and international environments and are 
subject to a transitional process of accommodation. 
There is a broad debate among scholars pertaining to 
the type of civil-military relations most suitable to the 
United States. Samuel Huntington argues for a politically 
neutral, professional military (strictly barred from 
politics), subject to objective civilian control. Morris 
Janowitz sees a military committed to the minimal use of 
force, integrated into civilian society, and maintaining a 
broad political perspective. Charles Moskos believes that 
the optimal configuration would be a "plural" one, with 
specific segments of the military having different 
connections with the society. Sam Sarkesian considers three 
interconnected subsystems (civilian elites, military 
leadership, and military society) partially overlapping 
against the broader background of the political-social 
system. 6 
Several criteria were formulated to describe what 
"effective" or "good" civil-military relations mean in the 
case of the United States: 
capitalism for the changes in collective action. See Sidney Tarrow, 
Power in Movement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 154. 
6 See Don M. Snider and Miranda A. Carlton-Carew, "The Current 
State of U.S. Civil-Military Relation: An introduction," in Don M. 
Snider and Miranda A. Carlton-Carew, Eds., u.s. Civil-Military 
8 
• One party to a civil-military decision does not 
encroach in the clearly defined sphere of the other; 
• The number of major conflicts between civilian and 
military leaders as decisions are made is low (the 
lower the better); 
• The policies produced by civilian and military 
leaders are "good" (e.g. increased gender 
integration within the armed forces signals good 
civil-military relations); 
• Civilian and military leaders get along with each 
other and operate with comity; 
• The results of decision making match the initial 
position of the appropriate actor.? 
A thorough assessment identified several interactions 
relevant to the present subject: 
(a) Relations between the u.s. military and the public; 
(b) relations between the u.s. military and influential 
elites; (c) relations between the u.s. military and 
political decision makers, (d) the implications of an 
all-volunteer professional military for civil-military 
relations; and (e) civil-military relations in a 
changing international order. 8 
The consensus is that current u.s. civil-military 
relations are "strained." Four trends account for this 
situation: 
(a) Changes in the international system and, thus, in 
the u.s. strategic response; (b) the rapid drawdown of 
the military; (c) domestic demands on the military and 
society's cultural imperatives; and (d) the increased 
role of nontraditional missions for the military.9 
An investigation of the domestic environment points to 
three unsettling trends: 
Relations: In Crisis or Transition (Washington D.C.: The Center for 
Strategic Studies and International Studies, 1995), pp. 4-5. 
7 Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
B Ibid., p. 8. 
9 
[1] Immigration, [2] the increasing minority 
population, and [3] the growth of the population ages 
65 and older ... Today' s immigration levels may ... lead to 
increased public pressure for the allocation of federal 
funds away from national defense towards domestic 
concerns.
10 
The argument is that a possible upsurge of racial-
ethnic tensions might push defense downward on the public's 
list of priorities. 11 Nevertheless, the military have a 
tradition in the U.S. as a tool for integrating racial and 
ethnic minorities. 12 
The third trend, namely the growth of the population 
age~ 65 and over, has two potential negative outcomes: the 
aging of the population will shrink the pool available for 
the armed forces, and will divert funding to pay the social 
bill. Sociological conditions and a system of education 
inadequate "for significant proportions of the population" 
will require supplemental efforts to attract and retain 
youth qualified for "a technologically sophisticated 
force. ,,13 
9 Ibid. 
10 James F. McIsaac and Naomi Verdugo, ·Civil-Military Relations: 
A Domestic Perspective,· in Snider and Carlton-Carew, p. 22. Actually, 
the first two trends are not totally independent. McIsaac and Verdugo 
examine the arrival of new immigrants and the numeric increase of 
established minority groups (enjoying citizen status) as distinct 
phenomena. 
11 Ibid., p. 23. 
12 "According to Professor Charles Moskos, blacks occupy more 
management positions in the military than in business, education, 
government or any other significant sector of society." See "The 
Mili tary I s New Stars, " in U. S. News and World Report, April 18, 1988, p. 
39. 
13 Snider and Carlton-Carew, pp. 24-25. 
10 
This dire prediction might miss the point of cyclical 
evolution. For instance, 93% of the newly enlisted in 1988 
had high-school diplomas, compared with 68% in 1978; more 
than 15,500 would-be midshipmen applied for 1,320 places in 
the 1988 plebe class at the Naval Academy, compared with 
9,000 a decade earlier; virtually all Air Force Academy 
cadets graduated in the top one fifth of their high-school 
class. 14 Therefore, the difficulty in recruiting properly 
qualified youth might be only transitory. Furthermore, 
against the background of a shrinking military, the 
requirement for qualified recruits might decline in 
importance. 
The analysis of "influential elites, ,,15 which includes 
the intellectuals, the media, the military-industrial 
complex, and the governing elites, indicates that the 
military are growing somewhat apart from the civilian side 
of society, due to the appearance of "military illiteracy," 
a phenomenon attributed to the baby boomers' ascending to 
elite status. Lacking military training (and with different 
professional interests), the baby boomers have a different 
perception of military matters, reflected both in media 
coverage of the military and the policy making process. 
14 See "The Military's New stars." 
11 
The different perceptions may account for distinct 
views pertaining to the military mission. 16 The military is 
reluctantly admitting that the national security realm is 
wider than during the cold war years, thus accepting the 
notions of operations other than war, as long as they do not 
compromise war-fighting capability and readiness, while 
civilian "influential elites" see a domestic role for the 
military, 
Includ[ing] defense conversion (to assist businesses 
--through dual-use technology development-- and 
communities make the transition from dependence on the 
military) and community assistance (to address 
critical domestic needs in education and job training, 
health care, disaster relief, and engineering and 
infrastructure) .17 
Two factors heighten the relevance of nontraditional 
military missions in the U.S. case: the end of the Cold War 
superpower confrontation and the ensuing demise of the 
soviet Union, leading to the perception that the military is 
looking for a new mission, and the election in 1992 of a 
president with a predominantly domestic agenda. 1S 
15 See Mark J. Eitelberg and Roger D. Little, "Influential Elites 
and the American Military after the Cold War," in Snider and Carlton-
Carew. 
16 See curtis L. Gilroy, "Civil-Military Operations and the 
Military Mission: Differences between Military and Influential Elites," 
in Snider and Carlton-Carew, pp. 68-88. 
17 The underlying idea is to take advantage of military's assets 
to support civil-military program. See Gilroy, p. 83 and 68, emphasis in 
the original. 
18 Ibid., p.69. 
12 
The first factor presents the U.S. policy makers with 
two options: a large military organization, with an 
increased domestic and non-military role, or the 
preservation of traditional war-fighting missions for a 
smaller force (which could be the core of a larger force, 
developed if contingencies require) .19 So far, there has 
been an unsteady compromise between the two factors. 
It has been argued that Huntington's "subjective-
objective" typology of civilian control over the military 
has never been taken to heart by any of the parties 
(civilian leadership and military) .20 Peter Feaver ascribes 
the current strains of the civil-military relationship to 
the challenge of defining a new role for the military, 
particularly to four fault lines dividing the parties: 
1. the primacy of force, splitting civilian hawks and 
military doves; 
2. how much force to use, splitting the military, who 
have consistently advocated using force quickly and 
decisively, and civilians, who have favored a 
measured and circumscribed approach; 
3. control of operations, splitting the military, who 
prefer delegative control, and civilians, who prefer 
assertive control; and 
4. clarity of mission, splitting the military, who seek 
ever clearer mission statements, and civilians, who 
19 See Michael C. Desch, "U.S. Civil-Military Relations in a 
Changing International Order," in Snider and Carlton-Carew, p. 175. 
Desch argues that the latter is preferable, despite its troublesome 
implementation (due to budgetary constraints and to difficulty to 
identify a convenient enemy). 
20 See Snider and Carlton-Carew, in Snider and Carlton-Carew, pp. 
5-7. 
13 
have shown a willingness to use military force on 
behalf of ambiguous and open-ended objectives. 21 
The impact of the economic element upon civil-military 
relations follows the attempt to reconcile the requirements 
of containing communism during the Cold War years, with the 
preservation of a burgeoning economy. The American emphasis 
on technology, as opposed to the Soviet approach, relying on 
extensive use of manpower, not only managed to preserve the 
democratic features of the American society, but eventually 
led to the collapse of the enemy.22 
B. THE CASE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR 
This section will consider Military Operation Other 
Than War both against the historical record and in the 
present circumstances. The discussion is in contiguity with 
the current u.S. debate on the topic. A brief investigation 
of MOOTW principles will compare them to the "principles of 
war" guiding the u.S. military. 
1. The Historical Record 
A discussion of the fundamental tasks of the United 
States military in the wake of the end of the Cold War 
21 See Peter D. Feaver, "Civil-Military Conflict and the Use of 
Force," in Snider and Carlton-Carew, pp. 129-130. 
22 See Paul Bracken, "Reconsidering Civil-Military Relations," in 
Snider and Carlton-Carew, pp. 147-150. 
14 
should touch on at least three issues: the changing 
strategic environment, the historical record, and the civil-
military relations. While a wide consensus exists about the 
traditional military mission, namely that of providing "the 
military forces needed to deter and protect the security of 
the united States, ,,23 the definition of present (and future) 
threats to u.S. national security has unleashed a stormy 
dispute among politicians, top brass, and scholars. The U.S. 
National Security Strategy distinguishes ethnic conflict, 
outlaw states, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
terrorism, organized crime, and environmental degradation, 
resource depletion, and rapid population growth as factors 
blurring the line between domestic and foreign policy.24 
An extended definition of military missions to cover 
military operations other than war (MOOTW) has led to 
concern about adverse the effects upon military readiness 
(especially in a time of shrinking defense budgets), as well 
as upon civil-military relations. 25 
23 Department of Defense, Organization and Functions (Washington, 
D.C., February 1990), quoted by Curtis 1. Gilroy, in Snider and Carlton-
Carew, p. 68. 
24 See A National Security Strategy for A New Century, May 1997, 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/Strategy/>, [4 August 1998]. 
25 The debate on the latter issue was covered in three essays by 
Colonel Charles Dunlap, Jr. "The Origins of the American Military Coup 
of 2012," Parameters 22, (Winter 1992-93), pp. 2-20, "Welcome to the 
Junta: The Erosion of Civilian Control of the U.S. Military," Wake 
Forest Law Review, Vol. 29, No.2, Summer 1994, pp. 341-392, and 
"Melancholy Reunion," USAF Institute for National Security Studies 
Occasional Paper 11 (October 1996). 
15 
MOOTW doctrine identifies no less than fifteen types of 
such operations. 26 One can distinguish at least two driving 
forces behind the 'expansion' of the military mission. Some 
maintain that 
Missions in the areas of humanitarian assistance, 
disaster relief and medical care, law and civil rights 
enforcement and labor relations, and engineering, and 
public works have been a fundamental time-honored 
tradition of the u.S. military from the earliest day of 
the Republic. 27 
This argument sets a different course to the debate, by 
dismissing to a certain extent the notion that MOOTW are 
filling the gap left after the dismantling of the Warsaw 
Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
The scope of intervention by the U.S. military in 
domestic contingencies is extensive. Two scholars have 
counted more than "160 occasions on which State and Federal 
troops have intervened in labor disputes. ,,28 
In addition, the U.S. military is the victim of its own 
26 "Arms control, combating terrorism, DOD support for counterdrug 
operations, enforcement of sanctions! maritime intercept operations, 
enforcing exclusion zones, ensuring freedom of navigation and 
overflight, humanitarian assistance, military support to civil 
authorities, nation assistance! support to counterinsurgency, 
noncombatant evacuation operations, peace operations, protection of 
shipping, recovery operations, show of force operations, strikes and 
raids." See Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, Joint Publication 3-07: Joint Doctrine for Military Operations 
Other Than War (Washington, D.C., June 1995), p. III-I. 
27 Sanford Terry, Military Operations other Than War: Implications 
for the U.S. Air Force, Report no. 94-286 F (Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service, March 1994), cited in Gilroy, pp. 71-72. 
28 See Philip Taft and Philip Ross, "American Labor Violence: Its 
Causes, Character, and outcome,· in Roger Lane and John J. Turner, Eds., 
Riot, Rout, and Tumult: Readings in American Social and Political 
16 
success, due to a combination of several factors: unique 
assets available on extremely short notice, special 
training, discipline and equipment, sophisticated logistics 
and organizational structure, and high confidence among the 
pUblic. 29 This has led the most influential advocate of the 
nontraditional domestic role for the military, Senator Sam 
Nunn, to claim that 
The American taxpayers have invested in and have built 
a great stockpile of innovative ideas, knowledge, 
trained, talented people, and equipment in the military 
over the years. These resources if properly matched to 
local needs and coordinated with civilian efforts, can 
made a useful contribution. 30 
2. Principles of War and Principles of Military 
Operations Other Than War Compared 
A brief review of traditional "principles of war," and 
of "principles of military operations other than war," leads 
to the conclusion that the latter are "an extension of 
warfighting doctrine"31 adjusted to a different environment, 
with its own specific requirements. 
The principles of war, hailed as "the enduring bedrock 
of U.S. military doctrine," are: objective, offensive, mass, 
economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, 
Violence (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978), p. 243. 
29 See Gilroy, pp. 74-75. 
30 Quoted by Gilroy, p. 83. 
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surprise, and simplicity.32 A different, albeit related set 
of principles guides joint operations other than war: 
objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, 
perseverance, and legitimacy.33 
While three of MOOTW principles, namely objective, 
unity of effort, and security are derived from their 
traditional counterparts, the remaining three (restraint, 
perseverance, and legitimacy) are imposed by the different 
circumstances of MOOTW. These three principles are critical 
to the operation's success in numerous circumstances. 
Even the first three objectives present additional 
encumbrances. Defining mission success is more difficult 
than in a traditional warfighting setting, because political 
objectives might not overlap with military end states. Unity 
of effort, as opposed to unity of command (directing all 
means to a common purpose) is complicated by command 
arrangements. For instance, peace operations are usually 
conducted as multinational efforts, with civilian agencies 
(international governmental as well as private volunteer 
organizations) operating alongside military forces in 
coalition arrangements. Leaving aside the inherent 
31 Joint Pub 3-07, p. V111. 
32 See Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, Joint Publication 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, 
D.C., June 1995), pp. A-1 to A-3. 
33 See Joint Pub 3-0, p. V-2. 
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complications in the chain of command, a serious handicap 
affecting these operations is the reluctance to accept 
subordination of U.S. contingents to foreign operational 
control. These circumstances might impair security as well, 
due to political issues related to U.S. forces providing 
security to specific NGOs (PVOs). 
Two MOOTW-specific principles, namely perseverance and 
restraint, may come at odds with the abhorrence of the U.S. 
military towards protracted involvement in foreign 
contingencies, as well as with the principle of "mass," 
requiring the "concentr[ation] of combat power at the place 
and time to achieve decisive results. ,,34 
While critical to mission success, the principle of 
legitimacy posses additional political strains on U.S. 
forces committed abroad. Legitimacy is actually a three-
level issue, involving the local populace, the U.S. public, 
and the international public opinion. 
The argument is that an increased military dedication 
to MOOTW (especially in domestic operations) would harm the 
military ethos by eventually leading the officer corps to an 
outright rejection of its primary mission, i.e. fighting and 
winning the nation's wars. Due to different-even conflicting 
at times-worldviews, the military might come to question 
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civilian supremacy in defense and security matters. By 
trying to fix each and every societal dysfunction (real or 
perceived), the military could be tempted to assume a "neo-
praetorian" role. While Charles Dunlap's cataclysmic 
vision35 reflects an inherited distrust of large standing 
armed forces, the side effects of an increased overlap of 
the military and political realms should not be dismissed 
easily. According to some scholars, to prevent such 
undesirable outcomes, 
The best option, in terms of military effectiveness and 
civilian control of the military, is to push for 
further reductions in force posture but to maintain the 
military focus on traditional, external military 
missions. 36 
For the predictable future the u.s. military will be 
increasingly involved in nontraditional missions. The issue 
at stake is the "balance when the military is downsizing-in 
terms of personnel, materiel, and budgets. ,,37 Since the 
probability of a major contingency is low for the time 
being, the military will have to sometimes sacrifice 
military readiness in favor of MOOTW. 
34 Joint Pub 3-0, p. A-l. 
35 See Dunlap, "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 
2012. " 
36 Desch, p. 178. 
37 Gilroy, p. 83, emphasis in the original. 
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C. CONCLOSION 
The current status of U.S. civil-military relations is 
influenced by factors pertaining both to U.S. domestic 
trends and to the international environment. The paramount 
international factor bearing influence upon u.s. civil-
military relations is certainly the end of the Cold War, 
with the subsequent dismantling of the Soviet union, 
America's arch-rival. Among the most relevant domestic 
factors, one can cite age and racial distribution changes, 
elite and public perceptions, the implications of an all-
volunteer force (alongside the traditional American emphasis 
on technology versus sheer numbers), and the changing agenda 
of the baby-boomer political decision-makers. 
The allegedly new type of missions~ilitary Operations 
Other Than War--has magnified the ongoing debate over the 
model of civil-military relations best suited to the United 
States. The U.S. military's involvement in MOOTW has seen a 
significant increase in the 1990s, raising questions about 
its impact on readiness. A wider debate has questioned the 
very relevance and appropriateness of MOOTW, due to its 
conflicting requirement with the military's main mission, 
i.e. fighting and winning America's wars. An unsettling 
potential development adjoining MOOTW is the collapse of the 
21 
military ethos, which would be replaced by a "praetorian" 
mentality. 
The defendants of MOOTW point to the unique 
capabilities of the military in terms of assets, personnel, 
and training, which puts them in an excellent position to 
deal with several issues. The defendants of MOOTW claim that 
the military should be involved in the fight against 
societal problems, since the taxpayers have invested a great 
deal in building these capabilities. In addition, the 
advocates of non-traditional military missions advance an 
extended definition of national security, to include non-
military threats. 
Another reason underlying the u.s. military undertaking 
of MOOTW is the historical record. The federal military has 
been involved in this type of mission from the onset of the 
Republic, while the state militia--the predecessor of the 
National Guard--undertook these missions even in colonial 
times. 
Put in these terms, the issue becomes one of balance 
and proper employment. While no one can deny the primacy of 
the external defense mission of the military, the current 
international and domestic environments will still require a 
certain dedication to MOOTW. In times of shrinking budgets, 
resources should be balanced to cover both ends of the 
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spectrum. In addition, the decision-makers should 
acknowledge both the fact that the military cannot serve as 
panacea to every societal problem, as well as the potential 
adverse effects of an exaggerated dedication to MOOTW. 
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III. CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY IN ROMANIA 
A. BACKGROUND 
The end of the Cold War and the termination of Soviet 
domination over Central and Eastern Europe led to the 
emergence of new democratic regimes in the region. One of 
the most challenging tasks confronting the newly established 
ruling democratic elites is the restructuring (i.e. 
modernization) of the military establishments. Two driving 
forces can be identified behind this process: first, the 
functional imperative,38 in this case the tremendous changes 
in the regional (and global) security environment, and 
second, the societal imperative (the urge to accommodate the 
new dominant liberal-democratic values with the military 
establishment, against the broader background of integration 
into the Western democratic family). New policies are to be 
developed and implemented to allow a proper role for the 
civilian decision-makers to formulate national security 
policies and establish parliamentary control over military 
expenditures. This transition covers broadly the shift from 
38 See Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 2. 
25 
L-________________________ ~_~ _____________ ~~_~ ____ _ 
the penetration model of civilian control to the liberal 
one. 39 
According to the penetration model, 
Civilian governors obtain loyalty and obedience by 
penetrating the armed forces with political ideas (if 
not fully developed ideologies) and political 
personnel. Throughout their careers, officers (and 
enlisted men) are intensely imbued with the civilian 
governors' political ideas. 
In the case of the liberal model, 
Civilians holding the highest 'governmental offices--be 
they elected, appointed, or anointed--are responsible 
for and skilled in determining domestic and foreign 
goals, overseeing the administration of laws, and 
resolving conflicts among social, economic, and 
political groups. Military officers are trained and 
experienced in the management and application of force, 
responsible for protecting the nation against external 
attack and the government against internal violence. 4o 
In his landmark study on Spain's transition to 
democracy, Felipe Aguero defines 
Civilian supremacy as the ability of a civilian, 
democratically elected government to conduct general 
policy without interference from the military, to 
define the goals and general organization of national 
defense, to formulate and conduct defense policy, and 
to monitor the implementation of military policy.41 
His further elaboration on the necessity of the removal 
of "the military from power positions outside the defense 
area" has limited applicability to the former Communist 
39 See Eric A. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics (Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1977). 
40 Ibid., pp, 12-18. 
26 
nations in Central and Eastern Europe, since the military 
traditionally held only one ministerial office except 
defense, namely the Ministry of Interior (which had been 
organized along military lines). In all Central and East 
European nations, civilian officials now hold this position. 
In the investigation of the nature of civil-military 
relations in Romania, this paper will follow to a certain 
extent the criteria set by Aguero for civilian supremacy: 
(1) Some habituation--in the sense of repeated 
practice--has been reached over a number of years in 
the exercise of civilian leadership as stated in the 
definition; (2) the prerogatives contemplated in this 
definition have been formalized in the nation's 
constitution or other major laws; (3) no overt 
challenge by the military institution has taken place 
over a number of years, and (4) the military had to 
accept one major decision taken by civilian authorities 
about which military opposition has been previously 
voiced. 42 
Aguero aptly notes that "the nature of the elite in 
control of the transition and the extent of its control will 
be affected by the transition path. ,,43 His description of 
the Romanian transition as civilian with high levels of 
influence over the process by the outgoing authoritarian 
regime is accurate only for the first part of the process. 44 
Actually, as far as the classification of the transitions in 
41 Felipe Aguero, Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy: Post-Franco 
Spain in Comparative Perspective (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University 
Press, 1995), p. 19. 
42 Ibid., pp. 21-22. 
43 Ibid., p. 29. 
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Central and Eastern Europe is concerned, Aguero seems to 
miss the point. Huntington provides a different point of 
view: 
In cases of regime transformation, the initiative carne 
from reformers in the government ... Hungary tend[s] to fit 
this model. In cases of regime replacement, the 
authoritarian regime collapses or is overthrown and the 
democratic opposition comes to power; ... East Germany and 
Romania tend to fit the model. In still other cases of 
transplacement, democratization is the joint product of 
government and opposition groups; ... Poland and 
Czechoslovakia approximate this model. 45 
The following brief historical survey of the Romanian 
military establishment, focusing on the officer corps, 
attempts to determine whether its features (expertise, 
responsibility and corporateness) endow it with the 
prerequisites to rise up to the challenge of change. 
According to Huntington, "the management of violence" might 
qualify as the central skill of military competence, 
acquired through a dual education (specific and "liberal"). 
The officer has a special social responsibility guided by 
his professional ethics (expressed in custom, tradition, and 
the continuing spirit of the profession). The officer corps 
44 Ibid., p. 65. 
45 Samuel P. Huntington, "Democrati zation and Security in Central 
and Eastern Europe, II in Peter Volten, Ed., Uncertain Futures: Eastern 
Europe and Democracy (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990), p.41, 
emphasis in the original. 
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is an autonomous social unit, molded by the functional 
imperatives of security.46 
The interaction between the military and society shall 
be analyzed with a view to detecting political proclivities 
of the former. This approach shall be linked to an 
investigation of the legal framework, and the details of 
day-by-day military operation. The conclusions will provide 
a description of civilian control of the military in 
Romania. While accepting AgUero's argument, "that 
democratization and civilian supremacy can be secured 
without prior voluntary support of the democratic credo by 
members of the armed forces, ,,47 historical evidence supports 
the notion that the existence of this credo may nevertheless 
alleviate some of the process' hardships. Moreover, one 
should scrutinize the patterns developed over the longer 
historic cycles. A short-term approach could easily dismiss 
significant trends in military behavior. 
B. THE HISTORICAL RECORD 
1. Pre-Communist Tradition 
In 1859, the principalities of Moldova and Wallachia 
were united, adopting the name of Romania in 1862. Romania 
46 See Huntington, The Soldier ... , pp. 8-18. 
47 Aguero, p. 21. 
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was created a kingdom in 1881. The modern armed forces 
(first formations established in 1834 in the principality of 
Wallachia) were trained by a French military mission, and 
provided by French equipment. Romanian officers were 
accepted into the French military academies at St. Cyr, 
Metz, Brest, and Saumur. The first Romanian officer training 
college was established in 1864. 48 The newly established 
army suffered a baptism of fire in the War of Independence 
(1877-1878), and was to be the main instrument in the 
achievement of grand national policy objectives during the 
Second Balkan War and both World Wars. Force structure, 
equipment and training were designed to match those of 
Romania's major allies (the Entente in the First World War 
and the Axis in the second). 49 
The period between 1859 and 1938 (the creation of the 
national state and the imposition of the "royal 
dictatorship" by King Charles II, respectively) is commonly 
regarded as a period of genuine democratic development, 
covering the field of civil-military relations as well. 5o 
The very existence of this era provides a sense of 
48 See Karl Wheeler Soper, "Chapter 5. National Security," in 
Ronald D. Bachman, Ed., Romania: A Country Study (Washington DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1991), pp. 255-256. 
49 See George W. Price, "The Romanian Armed Forces," in Jeffrey 
Simon, Ed., NATO-Warsaw Pact Force Mobilization (Washington DC, The 
National Defense University Press, 1988), p. 484. 
30 
continuity to the current democratization process. The 
underlying assumptions are that: 
• The institution of democratic control over the Army is 
not exactly a novelty; it has historical roots, 
measurable in tens of decades, which are almost 
intertwined with those of the modern Romanian State. 
• The prevalence of civilian authorities over the Army 
is a valid explanation--along with the people's 
vocation for observing law and authorities, as well as 
the rights of other peoples-for the lack ... of military 
coups d'etat or wars of aggression. 
• The current legislation is therefore expressing a 
certain continuity, which was' only suspended under the 
totalitarian regime; otherwise put, MPs of the late 
20th century were inspired by and extracted from 
previous Romanian legislation those dimensions 
defining domestic democracy and aimed at leveling them 
with regulations from longstanding democracies. 51 
The country's legal framework (incorporated both in the 
fundamental laws: the Paris Convention of 1859, the 1866 and 
1923 Constitutions, as well as the organic laws) points to a 
pattern of civil-military relations epitomizing the liberal 
model. 
The bicameral Parliament exercised its oversight via 
budget appropriations and ministerial accountability. As a 
rule, active officers were barred from party politics, even 
though they could serve as cabinet ministers. 52 
50 See "Historical Survey, " in Romanian Ministry of National 
Defence Website, available [online] at 
<http://mil.logicnet.ro/41100e.htm> [25 May 1998]. 
51 Ibid. Coups d'etat initiated will be discussed later. 
52 Ibid. 
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2. Communist Era Developments 
The Soviet occupation after tpe Second World War and 
the imposition of Communist rule led to the forceful 
restructuring of the armed forces according to the Soviet 
pattern,S3 and to the adoption of a pattern of civil-
military relations in line with the penetration model, as 
defined by Nordlinger. 
After 1958, when Soviet occupation forces were 
withdrawn, Romania curtailed its commitment to the Warsaw 
Pact to a minimum, embarking upon an independent national 
defense doctrine emulating the Yugoslav 'nation-in-arms' 
concept, but drawing lavishly from its own historic record 
as well. The 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia by the 
combined forces of the Soviet union and its trusted allies 
(Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR and Poland) widened the gap 
between Bucharest and Moscow. Romania adopted a policy of 
self-sustenance.in the field of procurement and terminated 
the officers' training in the USSR. Indoctrination stressed 
the "national" feature of officers' training. Reading 
53 Force structure, equipment and training, were restructured to 
allow subordination to the Soviet High Command (later to the Warsaw Pact 
Combined Command of the Combined Armed Forces). See Jeffrey Simon, 
Warsaw Pact, p. 13. 
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between the lines, it was obvious that the 'Big Brother' had 
become the paramount security threat. 54 
The process was paralleled by the development of an 
extensive education and training system, emphasizing the 
need for a professional officer corps. The Institute for 
Military History and Theory (established in the late 1970s) 
was instrumental in the development of the defense doctrine, 
which emulated earlier Romanian military developments, 
without neglecting the aforementioned 1859-1938 period. 
Eventually, this trend backfired, since it developed a sense 
of corporateness among the officer corps. 
This emphasis on a professional officer corps did not 
preclude Communist propaganda. As Karl Soper notes: 
The ... political indoctrination program was founded on 
socialist and nationalist ideologies ... It conspicuously 
lacked the pro-Soviet sentiment and "socialist 
internationalism" characteristic of indoctrination in 
the other Warsaw Pact countries. Officers were subject 
to party discipline outside the military chain of 
command. 55 
Fundamental contradictions developed between 
Ceausescu's policies and the corporate interests of the 
military. The reductions in the defense budget and military 
personnel as well as the extensive use of the armed forces 
54 See Simon, Warsaw Pact ... , pp. 27, 30-31 and 207. Most of these 
features may be easily traced to the "maverick" policy conducted by 
Nicolae Ceausescu (Secretary General of the Romanian Communist Party 
between 1965-1989 and President of Romania between 1971-1989) vis-a-vis 
Moscow. 
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in domestic construction projects had negative impacts upon 
military training and readiness. Nor were the officers 
pleased with the top brass promotion according to 
Ceausescu's whims. 
Since the concept of the nation-in-arms prescribed by 
the "War of the Entire People" doctrine which included an 
extended role for the Patriotic Guards (namely guerilla 
warfare), the Ministry of National Defence was supposed to 
cooperate closely with the Guards and provide them with 
equipment. The Patriotic Guards were created in the 
aftermath of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. The 
Guards were a militia force, recruited on a factory base. 
For instance, a behemoth like "23 August" (heavy industry 
works) provided an entire light infantry division. The 
Patriotic Guards were not supposed to provide replacements 
to the active force component, like the reserve proper. 
Instead, they were expected to operate in territory "under 
temporary enemy occupation," in order to force the enemy to 
deploy an increased number of occupation troops, and thus to 
increase the costs. In addition, the doctrine required them 
to harass small enemy units, communication lines, and depots 
to augment the enemy's attrition.' Their requirement of light 
weapons conflicted with the military's need for more 
SS See Soper, p. 265. 
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advanced weapons and equipment. The insignificant control 
exercised by the Ministry of National Defence explained to a 
certain extent the notion of the Patriotic Guards as a 
counterbalance to the regular armed forces. Nevertheless, 
professional officers regarded the traditional armed 
services as the sole institution able to conduct the full 
range of military missions. 56 
3. Military Involvement in Politics 
Romanian modern history records three instances of 
overt military involvement in politics. In January 1941 the 
army, backing General Ion Antonescu, Chairman of the Council 
of Ministers, crushed a coup attempt by the Iron Guards (a 
far-right movement with Nazi leanings, actually the sole 
legal party at the time), and formed a Cabinet with high-
ranking officers and technocrats. 57 This movement might be 
construed as a guardian praetorian COUp58 since the military 
toppled a civilian government and assumed power. The main 
reason behind this move was the interference by foreign 
factors (Nazi Germany) in domestic policy. The regime's 
association with Germany on the eastern front enjoyed 
56 Ibid., p. 268. 
57 For details on the Antonescu regime, see Vlad Georgescu, The 
Romanians: A History (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1991), pp. 
210-222. 
58 See Nordlinger, pp. 24-25. 
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initial popular support. After the conspicuous failure of 
this policy, officers close to the chief of the General 
Staff, and inspired by King Michael and his pro-Western 
Camarilla, staged a successful coup in August 1944. The 
military did not seize power. A broad coalition Cabinet, 
which at once declared war on the Axis and joined the Allied 
camp, was formed instead. This time a military faction 
operated as a moderator. 59 Further democratizing 
developments were arrested by the ensuing Soviet occupation. 
The last appearance by the military on the political 
stage was witnessed during the December 1989 Revolution. The 
reequilibration model developed by Linz seems to be an 
appropriate tool for analysis, in spite of the different 
circumstances. 6o The structural system failure, since both 
value production and value distribution alienated society 
from the state, led to the loss of legitimacy by the ruling 
elite. The crisis reached a peak, when the coercion 
instrument (the police and security forces) was not abl~r 
more likely, not wi11ing--to contain the mass upheaval. The 
political vacuum created by the collapse of all but one 
component of state power was temporarily filled by the armed 
59 See Nordlinger, pp. 22-24. 
60 See Juan J. Linz, ·Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration," in 
Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Eds., The Breakdown of Democratic 
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forces, mainly by default. The army promptly relinquished 
power to the new authorities, which emerged from the maze of 
the Revolution. 61 
Despite their oath of allegiance to the executive 
power, in all the aforementioned cases the loyalty of the 
Romanian officer corps swayed, due to its "unwritten norms 
transmitted through the professional educational system. ,,62 
Its specific features commanded a responsibility towards 
society and not towards the state. 
The strong interaction between society and military, 
due to a long record of wars of survival, led early to the 
reliance upon the 'nation-in-arms' model. The Romanian 
pattern of civil-military relations has vacillated between 
Huntington's fifth category: 
Promilitary ideology, low military political power, and 
high military professionalism. This type might be 
expected in a society relatively safe from security 
threats and dominated by a conservative or other 
ideology sympathetic to the military viewpoint,63 
Regimes (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1978), 
ch. 4. 
61 For detailed accounts (albeit somewhat dated) of the 1989 
events in Romania, see Peter Cipkowski, Revolution in Eastern Europe 
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc, 1991), pp. 118-147, and Jacques 
Levesque, The Enigma of 1989 (Berkeley, California: University of 
California Press, 1995), pp. 191-204. 
62 Huntington, The Soldier ... , p. 10. 
63 Huntington, The Soldier ... , p. 97. Usually, the military ranks 
first in most opinion surveys conducted after 1989, as far as public 
trust is concerned, in others it is second to the Church. There is here 
a certain variance from the model; nevertheless, the threat perception 




and his fourth one, differing from the previous in the sense 
that it is characterized by high military political power. 
One might thus conclude that available evidence 
suggests that the Romanian military establishment per se is 
not regularly prone to play a prominent role in the 
political game and is generally committed to the principle 
of democratic civilian control. Nevertheless, in situations 
where there appears to be no political solution to severe 
crises (and in cases of regime collapse), the military might 
step in for limited periods, to provide a surrogate for 
state authority. 
C. POST-COMMUNIST TRENDS IN THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT 
1. Theoretical Approach 
The Romanian officer corps is currently engaged in the 
development of expertise and corporateness consistent with 
the contemporary Western standards. This is one of the 
reasons why the military have so far been the mainstay of 
Romania's Euro-Atlantic integration policy. 
In his study dedicated to the issue of the admission of 
Central European nations into NATO, Jeffrey Simon develops a 
model outlining four conditions critical to the 
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effectiveness of democratic oversight and management of the 
military: 
1. A clear division of authority between president and 
the government (prime minister and defense/interior 
minister) in Constitution or through public law. The 
law should clearly establish who commands and controls 
the military and promotes military officers in 
peacetime, who holds emergency power in crisis, and who 
has authority to make the transition to war ... 
2. Parliamentary oversight of the military through 
public law ... 
3. Peacetime government oversight of General Staffs 
and military commanders through civilian defense 
ministers. Defense ministry management includes 
preparation of the defense budget, access to 
intelligence, involvement in strategic planning, force 
structure development, arms acquisition and 
developments, and military promotions ... 
4. Restoring of military prestige, trustworthiness and 
accountability for the armed forces to be effective. 64 
These criteria will be employed in the following 
investigation of the legal framework currently operating in 
Romania, with a view to determining the effectiveness of 
civilian control. 
2. Stages of the Reform Process 
The December 1989 Revolution and the strategic policy 
goal of integration in the ~uropean and Euro-Atlantic 
security structures confronted the military establishment 
with new requirements: the creation of a "leaner-but-meaner" 
64 Jeffrey Simon, NATO Enlargement & Central Europe: A Study in 
Civil-Military Relations (Fort McNair: The National Defense University 
Press, 1996), pp. 26-27, emphasis in the original. 
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force structured according to NATO standards; and the 
emergence of new strategic and operational requirements. 65 
The access of numerous Romanian officers to U.S., West 
European and NATO military academies, staff colleges and 
other institutions, is one of the means to achieve this 
goal, by bolstering the expertise of the officer corps.66 
The reform of the Romanian armed forces can be divided 
roughly into three stages. 67 The first stage, a preparatory 
one (1990-1993) comprised mainly the elimination of Party 
control structures and the dismantling of the structures 
specific to membership in the Warsaw Pact. The last career 
officer serving as Minister of National Defence supervised 
the elaboration of new doctrines and concepts. New 
organizational structures were tested. 
In the second stage of the reform (1993-1995), the 
restructuring of the Ministry of National Defence 
established an organizational structure compatible with 
genuine democratic civilian control. Personnel and equipment 
were downsized according to Romania's international 
commitments. Participation in the Partnership for Peace 
6S See "Principles in the Organization of the Armed Forces, " 
Romanian Ministry of National Defence Website, available [online) at 
<http://mil.logicnet.ro/5150000e.htm> [24 May 1998). 
66 See "Military Education, II in Romanian Armed Forces: A Partner 
for the Future (Bucharest: The Ministry of National Defence Public 
Relations Directorate, 1997), p. 26. 
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program, as well as in a series of international 
peacekeeping operations, triggered new trends of reform. 
The third stage (1996-2000) is more grass-roots 
oriented, and it is dedicated to the enhancement of the 
individual and unit performance. Civil-military relations 
are seen from a different perspective. In order to achieve 
compatibility with NATO counterparts, the Ministry of 
National Defence (and especially the General Staff) was 
refitted again in 1997. 
3. Legal Framework and Structures 
Articles 92 and 93 of the Constitution stipulate the 
division of powers mentioned by Simon. 68 According to 
Article 92: 
1) The President of Romania shall be Commander-in-Chief 
of the Armed Forces and presides over the Supreme 
Council for National Defence. 69 
2) He may declare, with prior approval of Parliament, 
partial or general mobilization of the Armed Forces. 
Only in exceptional cases shall the decision of the 
President be subsequently submitted to Parliament for 
approval, within five days from adoption thereof. 
3) In the event of an armed aggression against the 
country, the President shall take measures to repel the 
aggression and shall promptly notify the Parliament. If 
Parliament does not sit in a session, it shall be 
67 See Division General Dr. Constantin Degeratu, "The Reform of 
Romania's Armed Forces: A New Stage,· in NATO's Sixteen Nations 
(Uithoorn, The Netherlands: Jules Perel's Publishing Co., 1997), p. 25. 
68 See "Romania-Consti tution, II in International Consti tutional Law 
[online database], available [online] at <http://www.uni-
wuerzburg.de/law/ro00006.html-A092>[24 May 1998]. 
69 In Romania, the spelling in use is the British one. 
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convened de jure, within 24 hours from the outbreak of 
the aggression. 
Article 93 sets the framework for emergency measures: 
1) The President of Romania shall, according to the 
law, institute the state of siege or emergency 
throughout or in part of the country, and shall 
request Parliament approval of the measures thus 
adopted, within five days from adoption thereof. 
2) If Parliament does not sit in a session, it shall be 
convened de jure within 48 hours from the institution 
of the state of siege or emergency, and shall function 
throughout this state. 
The President has wide authority in the field of 
defense. Nevertheless, these powers are checked by the 
Parliament. 
According to Article 94,70 the President promotes the 
officers above the rank of Colonel (Army) and Commander 
(Navy and Air Force), at the recommendation of the Minister 
of National Defence. 71 
Parliamentary control is regarded as the "most 
complete, complex, incisive of all forms of control" 
exercised by public authorities over the armed forces. 72 
The Parliament approves any statutory regulation pertaining 
to the armed forces and the fundamental documents on 
national defense (defense doctrine). Any stationing of 
70 Ibid. 
71 In Romania, Commander is the equivalent for Navy Captain or Air 
Force Colonel. 
72 See "The Parliament," in Romanian Ministry of National Defence 
Website, available [online] at <http://mil.logicnet.ro/41200e.htm> [25 
May 1998]. 
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foreign forces on Romanian territory and any commitment of 
Romanian military personnel and/or equipment is subject to 
prior parliamentary approval, on a case-by-case basis. 
Finally, the Parliament exercises the "power of the purse." 
According to Article 19 of the Law 45 on the National 
Defence of Romania, 
The expenditure necessary to the organization, 
equipment, mobilization, maintenance and training of 
the active armed forces and of the reserve forces, and 
those for the financing of investment works of the 
armed forces shall be granted from the State budget and 
from other funds legally consti tuted. 73 
The standing Defence, Law enforcement and National 
Security Committees examine in depth all defense issues 
prior to plenary debates. 
Another body with attributions pertaining to national 
defense deserves special attention, since it commands 
extensive powers. The Supreme Council of National Defence 
(SCND) submits for parliamentary approval: 
a) The fundamental conception of defence of the 
country; 
b) The structure of the national defence system; 
c) The declaration of the state of war; 
d) In wartime, suspension of hostilities, conclusion of 
an armistice or cessation of the state of conflict. 
The SCND examines situations likely to necessitate: 
a) the general organization of the national defence 
system components; 
73 Ibid., emphasis added. It is obviously a loophole, albeit not a 
serious one, since it stipulates "legally constituted." 
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b) measures neces~ary for rejecting the aggression in 
crisis or at war; 
c) the plan for the mobilization of the national 
economy in the first year of war; 
d) dislocation and re-dislocation of great units on the 
national territory in peacetime; 
e) long-term procurement programmes; 
f) prognosis studies pertaining to the organization of 
the military industry; 
g) plans for the cooperation between the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and the Ministry of National 
Defence and their implementation; 
h) plans for the intervention of the Ministry of 
Interior and of the Ministry of National Defence in 
case of disasters; 
i) basic guidelines in the field of international 
military relations; 
j) the mandate of delegations participating in the 
negotiation and conclusion of agreements and 
treaties in the field of national defence, as well 
as the respective draft treaties; and 
k) reports of the heads of state administration 
organizations with responsibilities in the field of 
national defence and security and the implementation 
of the necessary measures. 74 
The SCND is chaired by the President and the Prime 
Minister acts as Vice-Chairman. Other members are: the 
Minister of Defense, the Minister of Interior, the Minister 
of Foreign affairs, the Minister of Reform, the head of the 
Political Analysis Department of the Presidency of Romania, 
the Director of the Romanian Intelligence Service, the Chief 
of the General Staff, and the Director of the Foreign 
Intelligence Service. 
74 See "The Supreme Council of National Defence," in Romanian 
Ministry of National Defence Website, available [online] at 
<http://mil.logicnet.ro/41270e.htm>[25 May 1998]. 
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The Supreme Council of National Defence is a powerful 
body within the central public administration whose role and 
influence extends far beyond the debating and setting of 
high level policy and strategy. Its attributions appear to 
allow for what we might consider to be micro-managem~nt of 
all areas of business within those State bodies that have 
responsibilities in the area of national defense and 
security, including the Ministry of National Defence. 
The spectrum of emergency situations requiring a 
coordinated government response range from natural disasters 
to responses to ensure national survival against external 
aggression, with internal unrest and insurrection somewhere 
in the middle. Clearly the reactions and the force levels at 
each end of the spectrum vary greatly and the commitment of 
Army forces will vary proportionally as will the designated 
lead authority. 
The employment of one supra-governmental body like the 
SCND to coordinate these responses places total power in the 
hands of such a body. It could be argued that democratic 
checks and balances could be more effectively ensured by the 
employment of separate councils for internal and external 
affairs. While there would be a danger of such a structure 
being less efficient than a unitary body, the increased 
level of transparency may be a price worth accepting. 
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The advantage in centralizing defence and security co-
ordination under one body would be the ability to respond 
rapidly to emergency situations requiring action by more 
than one government department. The design of the Supreme 
Council of National Defence anticipates both the current 
Constitution and form of government. Although its initial 
focus was towards crisis response, its role has expanded to 
a point where much of its business could be termed more 
routine in nature. 
The Ministry of National Defence is the central body of 
the executive which is tasked to organize, direct and guide 
activity in the defense field with the aim of ensuring 
Romania's independence, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, and constitutional order. It is obliged to 
observe and implement laws, decrees, Government decisions, 
and decisions made by the Supreme Council of National 
Defence. 
The first civilian Minister of National Defence was 
appointed in March 1994. This incumbent was not an elected 
representative. Following the general election a new 
Minister was appointed in December 1996 who is an elected 
representative. The Minister is responsible before the 
Government and Parliament for the entire activity of the 
Ministry of National Defence, of which the General Staff is 
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an integral part. Therefore, the Minister can issue 
mandatory instructions to military personnel through the 
military chain of command. As a member of the Supreme 
Council of National Defence, he is also representative to 
that body. He represents the Ministry in its relations with 
superior public authorities and other government departments 
in Romania, and with the defense ministries of other 
countries. 
The current organizational structure of the Ministry 
has a number of Directorates and offices reporting directly 
to the Minister. 75 They include the Advisors' Group to the 
Minister of National Defence, the Minister's Cabinet, the 
Human Resources Directorate, the Public Relations 
Directorate, the Financial Directorate, the Minister's 
Control Group, and the Military Protection and Safety 
Directorate. The Minister is directly responsible for 
coordinating the activities of the National Defence 
College. 76 In his other areas of responsibility the Minister 
works through the Chief of the General Staff, two other 
State Secretaries and an Inspector General. 
75 See "Structures subordinated to the minister of national 
defence," [sic] in Romanian Ministry of National Defence Website, 
available [online] at <http://mil.logicnet.ro/6100100e.htm>[24 May 
1998] . 
76 The National Defence College was established in 1993 with a 
dual mission: to familiarize the potential civilian officials with 
defense and security issues, and to introduce senior military officers 
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The Chief of the General Staff is the senior military 
commander of the Romanian ground, air and air defence, and 
naval forces. He is subordinate to the President as 
Commander in Chief, and to the Minister of Defence and the 
Supreme Council of National Defence for the peacetime 
direction of the Armed Forces. While the post is equal in 
status to a State Secretary, the incumbent is appointed for 
a period of four years by the President of Romania, at the 
suggestion of the Minister for National Defence and with the 
agreement of the Supreme Council of National Defence. The 
defence establishment sees this as an important step to 
ensure the political neutrality of the senior military 
command and to provide a degree of continuity in military 
matters on change of government. 
There is an imbalance between the planning inputs of 
the General Staff and the ministerial level within the 
Ministry of National Defence. The defence planning cycle has 
been budget based with the General Staff formulating their 
resource requirement according to their perception of the 
national defence and security needs. Parliament, through the 
defence committees, was asked to endorse the requirements 
and expenditure that were monitored by mechanisms such as 
the Audit Court. While the planning process was conducted 
to civilian control. In addition, journalists are encouraged to attend 
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under ministerial supervision and with the approval of the 
Supreme Council of National Defence, the impetus was driven 
from below rather than led from above. There would be 
advantages in setting up mechanisms to clearly establish 
endorsed defence policy and planning assumptions that, with 
parliamentary approval, could form the basis of short and 
long term planning in the future. 
D. CONCLOSION 
The information available leads to three main 
conclusions. The first one is related to the proclivities of 
the officer corps, as far as its involvement in politics is 
concerned. The historical record enables the observer to 
safely assume that in Romania, the officer corps has been 
historically committed to civilian control and has a strong 
democratic credo (manifested through an ingrained feeling of 
responsibility to the society). 
The second set of conclusions is devised against the 
background of AgUero's criteria for civilian supremacy. To a 
certain extent, the first three criteria are met. There is a 
"habituation" of the officer corps with the new version of 
civilian control. The prerogatives of the public authorities 




referendum in December 1991 and in organic laws. The author 
was not able to locate (as an inside observer) any overt 
challenge by the military against the civilian leadership 
between 1990 and 1998. As an example of a major contentious 
decision implemented by the civilian authorities (criterion 
four in Aguero), one could mention that the current Chief of 
the General Staff was appointed over a certain opposition of 
the top brass. He was not regarded as qualified, due to his 
rather junior position and his age. Nevertheless, his 
credentials are quite impressive,77 so the President decided 
to ignore the grumbling. Therefore, employing Aguero's 
criteria, civilian supremacy is a fact of life in Romania. 
The model developed by Simon provides a means to 
determine whether the control exercised by the civilians is 
effective. It is this student's opinion that separation of 
powers between public authorities is clear-cut and there are 
no overlaping or competing authorities. The line of command, 
both in peacetime and at war, is straightforwardly defined. 
Parliamentary oversight is present and effective. The 
Standing Committees operations have improved significantly, 
and the one in the lower house is chaired by the former 
Secretary of State and Head of the Defence Policy 
77 For his CV, see ·Secretary of State and Chief of General 
Staff," in Romanian Ministry of National Defence Website, available 
[online] at <http://mil.logicnet.ro.mil/3300000e.htm>[25 May 1998]. 
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Department. The purview of the civilian ministry of defense 
is quite impressive, and it deals with: defense planning, 
military counter-intelligence, personnel and training. As 
far as the restoration of military prestige is concerned, 
the military still ranks very high in all opinion polls. A 
genuine improvement of the military self-image is still a 
question for the future, in a time of shrinking defense 
budgets. An evaluation of Simon's criteria applied to 




IV. ROMANIA1S TRANSITION PROCESS 
A. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
A host of theories compete to provide satisfactory 
explanations of what is described by Samuel Huntington as 
"democracy's third wave." The prevailing trend seems to 
emphasize the role of "strategic interactions and 
arrangements among elites, conscious choices among various 
types of democratic constitutions, and electoral party 
systems. ,,78 Comparatively less attention is paid to the 
preconditions for establishing a viable democracy. 
Nevertheless, one should not dismiss the latter too easily. 
This chapter analyzes the present democratization 
process in Romania. 79 Usually, scholars single out Romania 
and Bulgaria as polities with little or no democratic 
tradition prior to World War II, as opposed to the Central 
European nations and the Baltic States. 80 Czechoslovakia is 
7B Doh Chull Shin, "On the Third Wave of Democratization," in 
World Politics 47 (October 1994), p. 139. 
79 Consisting, according to Shin, of four phases: (1) decay of 
authoritarian rule, (2) transition, (3) consolidation, and (4) the 
maturing of a democratic political order. See Shin, p. 141. There are 
two main problems with the process, as Shin rightly notes: one nation 
can "freeze" in a perpetual transition, or democracy can collapse even 
after "consolidation," due to a combination of factors. 
80 The study undertaken by Linz and Stepan shares this opinion and 
employs it to justify Romania's "exceptionalism." See Juan J. Linz and 
Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: 
Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore, 
Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 344. 
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cheered as the single full-fledged democracy in the region. 
This section shall employ both the historical record and 
recent developments to investigate the prospects for 
democracy in Romania. The intention is to predict the 
outcome of the democratization process, namely its chances 
of consolidation. 
There is a plethora of definitions of democracy, but 
the one provided by Tony Smith is both comprehensive and 
simple: 
A democracy is a political system institutionalized 
under the rule of law, wherein an autonomous civil 
society, whose individuals join together voluntarily 
into groups with self-designated purposes, collaborate 
with each other through the mechanisms of political 
parties and establish through freely contested 
elections a system of representative government. S1 
Nevertheless, as Russett duly notes,S2 rating 
democracy, and especially the degree of representiveness, is 
a tenuous endeavor. Thus, employing the cases of the United 
States and Great Britain, he qualifies as democratic a 
country with 10 percent of all citizens eligible to vote 
before the end of the nineteenth century. Only by the middle 
of this century is universal franchise required to qualify. 
One should note the issue of variance between present and 
81 Tony Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the 
Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 13. 
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past coding of democracies. Criteria are not static, and a 
country rated as democratic by its contemporaries, may be 
discarded, with the benefit of hindsight, as 
authori tarian. 83 
Dawisha and Parrott provide a useful roadmap for 
investigating Romania's transition process: 
I.What are the key elements of the pre-communist 
historical legacy of each country? 
2.What are the key elements of the legacy of the 
communist era? 
3.How did the nature of transition from 
communism. .. affect the formation of intermediary 
associations and parties in the early post-communist 
period? 
4.In the post-communist selection of government 
leaders, what has been the importance of competitive 
elections and other forms of citizen political 
participation compared with the threats of violence and 
the use of violence? Have military officers or the 
political police played a significant role in the 
transition process? 
5.What political forces and calculations shaped the 
late-communist and especially the post-communist 
electoral legislation and the timing of elections? 
6.What are the main social and ethnic cleavages in 
post-communist society?84 
82 See Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles 
for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1995), p. 15. 
83 There might be a hidden motive in depicting an opponent as non-
democratic. See for a comprehensive approach of the issue, Ido Oren, 
"The Subjectivity of 'Democratic' Peace: Changing u.s. Perceptions of 
Imperial Germany," in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven 
E. Miller, Eds., Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996). 
84 Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (Eds.), Politics, Power, and 
the Struggle for Democracy in South-East Europe (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 453, emphasis added. 
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A brief overview of Romania's modern period (that is, 
from the early nineteenth century to the establishment of 
Communist rule) reveals a case of unfinished 
modernization. 8s The establishment of democratic rule has 
been, complying with Shin's interpretation, elite driven. 
The institutions and, to some extent, the procedures of 
democratic rule were present, but, due to specific 
conditions, the middle class in pre-communist Romania was 
never strong enough to drive democracy to its consolidation 
stage. Following the three criteria set by Linz and Stepan 
this study argues that democratic consolidation is the 
consequence of these developments. 
-- Behaviorally, a democratic regime in a territory is 
consolidated when no significant national, social, 
economic, political, or institutional actors spend 
significant resources attempting to achieve their 
objectives by creating a nondemocratic regime or 
turning to violence or foreign intervention to secede 
from the state. 
-- Attitudinally, a democratic regime is consolidated 
when a strong majority of public opinion holds the 
belief that democratic procedures and institutions are 
the most appropriate way to govern collective life in a 
society such as theirs and when the support for anti-
85 An excellent account of the process is presented in Keith 
Hitchins, Romania 1866-1947 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). For a 
broader perspective, see: Florin Constantiniu, 0 Istorie Sincera a 
Poporului Roman (Bucharest: Univers Enciclopedic, 1997), and Vlad 
Georgescu, The Romanians: A History (Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State 
University Press, 1991). The following considerations draw mainly form 
Hitchins. There is no agreement by Romanian historians of the proper 
date for this event. December 30 1947, the day of King's Michael 
abdication and the ensuing creation of the People's Republic, seems 
proper to qualify as landmark, since the monarch was the last symbol of 
the former democratic period. 
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system alternatives is quite small or more or less 
isolated from the pro-democratic forces. 
-- Constitutionally, a democratic regime is 
consolidated when governmental and nongovernmental 
forces alike, throughout the territory of the state, 
become subjected to, and habituated to, the resolution 
of conflict within the specific laws, procedures, and 
institutions sanctioned by the new democratic 
process. 86 
B. FROM THE CREATION OF MODERN ROMANIA TO THE IMPOSITION 
OF COMMUNIST ROLE 
It is impossible to analyze here in great length the 
history of Romania. However, some events are of particular 
relevance for Romania's democratic development, and must be 
mentioned. The 1859 Paris Convention set a fundamental law 
for the principalities of Moldova and Wallachia'under 
Ottoman suzerainty. In 1859 the principalities were reunited 
under Prince Alexander Cuza, who reigned until 1866, and who 
submitted in 1864 a Statut curtailing' the powers of the 
legislature in favor of the executive and setting the 
essence of Romanian constitutionalism in the person of the 
prince. 
Between 1866 and 1914 Romania was ruled by Charles of 
Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen. 87 His branch of the Prussian 
86 See Linz and Stepan, p. 6. 
87 Romania gained independence in 1878, due to is participation to 
the Russo-Turkish war. It was created a kingdom in 1881. See 
Constantiniu, pp. 229-260. 
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dynasty was to rule Romania until 1947, with an interlude 
between 1940 and 1944. King Charles' major achievement was 
the Constitution of 1866, "resembl[ing] liberal fundamental 
laws in place in Western Europe ... both in form and in 
substance. ,,88 Nevertheless, the representative nature of 
constitutional rule was questionable, since property 
qualifications and its indirect nature (through electors) 
affected the franchise. The king retained significant 
authority and his role in the legislative process was 
decisive. The political scene was controlled by two major 
parties: the Conservatives (the great landowners), and the 
Liberals who reflected the interests of a coalescent 
bourgeoisie and tried to bring Romania to the mainstream of 
European economic and social life. Since the economy was 
overwhelmingly rural, the Liberals had to employ the state 
as a tool to create a bourgeoisie worthy of the name. 89 
The wake of World War I brought significant changes: 
Romanian provinces and territories occupied by foreign 
powers90 became part of the kingdom, universal franchise was 
adopted and a comprehensive land reform was implemented. 
88 See Hitchins, pp. 18-19. 
89 Following the classic mercantilist approach. Their motto was 
"By ourselves," mirroring their proclivity for protectionism in favor of 
infant industries. 
90 Transylvania (which was occupied by Hungary in the early tenth 
century), Bessarabia (occupied in 1812 by Russia), and Bukovina (seized 
by Austria in 1774). 
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Romanian society was confronted with a series of 
structural challenges: the completion of state building, the 
creation of a political society able to accommodate 
universal suffrage, and economic recovery after the war. 
State building was particularly difficult to achieve and one 
problem still lingers today, namely the integration of the 
Hungarian minority. Until 1918 Romania was particularly 
homogeneous (92.1 per cent ethnic Romanians, 3.3 per cent 
Jews, and other smaller minorities). In 1930, the Romanians 
were still the substantial majority of the population (71.9 
per cent, mainly of Orthodox persuasion), but there was a 
new minority formed by Hungarians (7.2 per cent), Germans 
(4.1 per cent), Jews (4 per cent), and Ukrainians (3.2 per 
cent) .91 
The Constitution of 1923 "promised extensive civil 
liberties and political rights to all citizens, but it left 
the details of precisely how these liberties and rights were 
to be exercised to the legislature. "92 The political 
landscape witnessed significant changes: land reform 
91 The change of status from one of the two titular nations in 
Austro-Hungary to a minority status was quite unpalatable to the 
Hungarian elites. The Jews, who represented one of the most dynamic 
stratum of the Romanian society, did arrive in great numbers only after 
1812, mainly from Russia. Despite allegations, anti-Semitism was never a 
mass phenomenon in Romania. However, the Jewish entrepreneurial spirit 
was resented in a patriarchal society, and after the 1929-33 depression, 
some anti-systemic forces were able to accrue support using the Jews as 
scapegoats. 
92 Hi tchins, p. 410. 
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destroyed the Conservatives' economic base, while the 
Liberals enjoyed a boost due to the growth of industry. A 
new force, the National Peasantist Party (left of center) 
resulted from the union of the Romanian National Party93 and 
the Peasantist Party. On the left of the political spectrum, 
the Social Democratic Party had a limited impact, since the 
urban population reached only 18 per cent in 1939. The 
Communist Party was a political outcast, since it was 
affiliated to the Comintern and advocated the dismantling of 
Romania. Founded in 1921, it was banned in 1924. Its peak 
membership was estimated at 2,000. The main "behavioral" 
threat came from the right side of the political spectrum. 94 
The "democratic experiment" of 1919-1930, as Hitchins 
calls it, collapsed due to a combination of external and 
internal factors. The emergence of revisionism of the 
Versailles treaty95 and the disintegration of collective 
security (Romania was one of the victims of appeasement) 
compelled Romania to abandon its traditional pro-French and 
pro-British policy and to orbit towards Germany, who had 
become its main economic partner. The main responsibility 
93 The bulwark of Romanian resistance in Transylvania. 
94 The Iron Guard, formed in 1927 as the Legion of Archangel 
Michael, and professing a vociferous anti-Semitism, combining Fascist 
and Nazi influences with Orthodox symbolism, commanded at its peak (the 
1937 elections) 15 percent of the vote. See Hitchins, pp. 403, 425. 
95 Three of its five neighbors harbored revisionist designs 
against Romania (Hungary, the Soviet Union, and Bulgaria). The other two 
fell prey to revisionism (Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia) . 
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still lay with King Charles II, a political adventurer, who 
usurped96 the throne in 1930, with the goal of undermining 
the system and establishing his own authoritarian rule. He 
succeeded in 1938, but due to significant territorial 
losses, he was forced to abdicate in September 1940. General 
Ion Antonescu assumed power and instituted a military 
dictatorship in January 1941. 97 
Despite universal male suffrage, a democratic 
constitution, and other significant achievements, Romanian 
inter-war democracy was still far from consolidated. The 
ruling party was able to employ all state structures to 
control the outcome of elections, and elections were usually 
accompanied by outbursts of violence. Moreover, the lack of 
a strong middle-class deprived the democratic system of a 
stronghold to prevent sliding towards authoritarianism. 
Romania joined the Allied camp on August 23, 1944. 
Antonescu was deposed by a coup congregating improbable 
associates: the National Peasantists, the Liberals, the 
Social Democrats, and the Communists. King Michael assumed 
power, and the 1923 Constitution was reinstated. To 
speculate upon the chances of resuming democratic 
96 A regency in the name of his son Michael ruled the country. 
97 After a brief cohabitation with the Iron Guard, he came on a 
collision course with the organization, due to their ineptitude and 
excesses. .. Antonescu made order and securi ty ... the reason of being for his 
regime." Hitchins, p. 468. 
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L...-___________________________________________ _ 
development after 23 August would be an exercise in 
futility. Nonetheless, one shall mention the Romanian 
people's commitment to a fresh start with democracy, even in 
these adverse circumstances. The democratic forces won the 
elections of November 1946 with a landslide support, but the 
Red Army-backed Communists "revised" the results. 98 
Romania was to enter-against her expressed will-half a 
century of Communist rUle. 99 
c. THE SULTANISTIC REGIME 
In order to address the questions raised by Dawisha and 
Parrot, Linz and Stepan provide a valuable analytical 
framework. Their interpretation provides a perceptive 
elucidation of Romania's democratization process. They 
conclude that Romania under Nicolae Ceausescu (1965-1989) 
met all conditions attributed by Weber100 to sultanistic 
regimes: 
Patrimonia12sm and in the extreme case, sultanism tend 
to arise whenever traditional domination develops an 
administration and a military force which are purely 
personal instruments of the master .... Where 
domination ... operates primarily on the basis of 
98 See Hitchins, p. 533. 
99 On the armed resistance against the communists, see 
Constantiniu, pp. 478-450. For interesting accounts of the Soviet 
occupation of Romania and subsequent installation of communist rule see 
Georgescu, and Alex P. Schmid, Soviet Military Interventions since 1945 
(New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Inc., 1985). 
100 Max Weber, Economy and Soci ety: An Outline of Interpretive 
Sociology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), quoted in 
Linz and Stepan, p. 51. 
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discretion, it will be called sultanism ... The non-
traditional element ... consists only in the extreme 
development of the ruler's discretion, distinguish [ing] 
it from every form of rational authority. 
Linz and Stepan dovetailed a taxonomy of non-democratic 
regimes (authoritarian, totalitarian, post-totalitarian, and 
sultanistic) with five major aspects of modern consolidated 
democracies101 (civil society, political society, rule of 
law, state apparatus, economic society) to infer the tasks 
for democratic consolidation. In all five aspects, a polity 
undertaking a transition from sultanism to democracy is 
rated low or low to medium. 102 They duplicated the process 
for the implications of prior non-democratic regime upon the 
transition path, but at this point, their description of the 
Romanian case is a bit oversimplified. The path, "Interim 
government after regime termination not initiated by regime 
(coup by nonhierarchical military, armed insurgents, or mass 
upraising and regime collapse)" should lead to a government 
dominated by groups associated with the sultan who claim 
popular legitimacy to carry out reforms and postpone 
elections ("non-democratic power") .103 
The sultanistic evolution of the Communist regime in 
Romania is connected to several factors: 
101 See Linz and Stepan, pp. 7-15. 
102 Ibid., p. 56. 
103 Ibid. p. 58. 
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• the proficient manipulation of party structures by 
Ceausescu, ending the nascent trend towards 
collegial leadership in the Romanian Communist Party 
(and subsequently preventing any attempt at 
destalinization); 
• a maverick foreign policy, capitalizing on 
Ceausescu's opposition to the 1968 Soviet invasion 
of Czechoslovakia, as well as on several other 
independent actions against the Moscow line 
(strictly obeyed by the rest of the Warsaw Pact) ; 
• a "capture of nationalism" (read aversion towards 
the Soviet Union), which demoralized for a long time 
the domestic opposition and deprived it of external 
support; 
• the pervasiveness and ruthlessness of the Securi tate 
(the secret police) .104 
Ceausescu's family controlled a host of key positions, 
while his rule became increasingly personalistic. He almost 
single-handedly designed "citadels," actually inept and huge 
industrial and architectural projects, and implemented a 
nefarious pro-natalist anti-abortion policy. 
As Linz and Stepan aptly note: 
These totalitarian and sultanistic tendencies combined 
to make all individuals, groups, and institutions 
permanently subject to the sultan's arbitrary 
intervention. The essence of sultanism is that no one 
is free from the exercise of despotic power by the 
sultan .... This extreme pluralization of power inevitably 
104 Moreover, "in the 1970s radical re-Stalinization characterized 
by domestic corruption and abuse" occurred. See Peter Cipkowski, 
Understanding the Collapse of Communism in Poland, Hungary, East 
Germany, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and the Soviet Union (New York: John 
Wiley & Sons, 1991), p. 123. Ceausescu refused to break diplomatic 
relations with Israel after 1967, was the first to initiate relations 
with the Federal Republic of Germany, and sided with Beijing in the 
Sino-Soviet dispute. All these alignments commanded unrestricted support 
by "[IJeaders from De Gaulle to Nixon." See Linz and Stepan, p. 348, and 
Vladimir Tismaneanu, "Romanian Exceptionalism? Democracy, Ethnocracy, 
and Uncertain Pluralism in post-Ceausescu Romania," in Dawisha and 
Parrott, pp. 412-413. 
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mean that there was no degree of institutional autonomy 
or pluralism in Romania .105 
Unlike any other Warsaw Pact country, Romania did not 
leave room for a "second culture." Almost all forms of 
dissent were limited to elite circles, employing "coded 
language." The regime went to great lengths to develop an 
ideology, employing "highly arbitrary symbols" in order to 
vivify the "extreme glorification of the leader." 
Ceausescu's cult of personality was officially launched 
after his trip to China and North Korea in 1971. 
Against these long odds, there were three cases of open 
opposition to Ceausescu's rule: the coal miners revolt in 
August 1977 (due to a planned revision of retirement 
legislation), a demonstration by workers in Brasov 
(Romania's second largest city) in November 1987, and the 
so-called "Letter of Six" in March 1989. The "group of six" 
consisted of former top Party officials, including a former 
minister of foreign affairs and one of the founding members 
of the Romanian Communist Party. The miners were co-opted by 
expeditious (albeit limited) measures to improve their 
plight, as well as by a jester-like display of Ceausescu as 
Romania's 'first miner. ,106 The Brasov protest was swiftly 
105 Linz and Stepan, p. 351. 
106 Adjoined by proletcultist bravado, this moment led to the 
consolidation of a 'working class vanguard' mentality among the miners, 
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crushed and its leaders were deferred to show-trials in the 
best Stalinist tradition. The group of six shared a 
different plight, due to the dual nature of Communist 
justice. They were never brought to trial, but were confined 
to house arrest. 
At the end.of the 1980s, the failure of "performance 
legitimacy" by the regime was conspicuous: 
Peasants had to travel to towns to find food; in winter 
people had to cook in the middle of the night because 
there was no gas during the day. People spent many 
hours each day lining up for the most basic food and 
household items, frequently discovering that none were 
available. Monthly rations of meat, cooking oil, and 
sugar were often cut .... Men were taxed if they and their 
wives failed to produce children. 107 
In Romania, a peaceful change of regime was not an 
option, since two crucial actors were missing: (1) 
"organized, nationally known, and nonviolent democratic 
groups in civil and political society," and (2) "soft-liners 
in the regime who have the desire and autonomy to negotiate 
a 'pacted reform. ,,,108 Indeed, Ceausescu withstood 
Gorbachev's exhortations to embark upon a reformist track. 109 
still present today and responsible to a great extent for their 
outbursts of violence after 1989. 
107 Cipkowski, p. 120. 
108 Linz and Stepan, p. 365. 
109 Some authors suggested that Ceausescu represented an "ideal 
negative type," to be used in Gorbachev's Western public relations 
campaign to advertise perestroika. See Jacques Levesque, The Enigma of 
1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1995), p. 193. 
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Schmitter also argues that the mode of transition to 
democracy has some bearing on the consolidation process: 
Differences in the level of mass mobilization (as 
opposed to elite domination) and in the extent of 
violence (opposed to negotiation) produce variations in 
constraints and opportunities. The most favorable 
context for an eventual consolidation is a "pac ted 
transition" in which elites from the previous autocracy 
and its opposition reach a stalemate and find 
themselves compelled to respect each other's interests. 
The least favorable is a revolution, with mobilized 
masses using force to topple the ancien regime. 110 
A comprehensive and satisfactory account of the 
December 1989 Revolution is still wanting. Suffice it to say 
that the Revolution had both domestic and external 
determinants. 111 The wave sweeping across Eastern Europe112 
was followed throughout Romania via Radio Free Europe and 
television stations of the neighboring countries, and the 
powder keg needed only a spark. 113 The coercive forces 
(Securitate and other Ministry of Interior forces, backed by 
110 See Philippe c. Schmitter, "Dangers and Dilenunas of Democracy," 
in Diamond and Plattner (Eds.), The Global Resurgence of Democracy 
(Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 84. 
111 For a documented review see Levesque, pp. 191-204. 
Nevertheless, other authors refute his confidence in the absence of 
Soviet involvement in Czechoslovakia, pivotal to his theory. "It is now 
established beyond the shadow of a doubt that the celebrated "Velvet 
Revolution" was prepared by an understanding between General Alois 
Lorenc, chief of Czechoslovak secret police, and General Victor Grushko, 
who contrived the scenario .... " See Constantiniu, p. 534. 
112 Huntington notes the "snowballing" effect in the case of 
Romania. See Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave," in Diamond 
and Plattner, p. 7. 
113 Provided by the eviction of a Hungarian Protestant pastor in 
the border city of Timisoara. Strangely enough, since his parish was 
tiny (the Hungarian minority in the city counts for less than 6 percent 
of the population), and the Romanians never protested before when 
hundreds of their churches were razed. 
67 
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detachments of the army) were not able to contain or to 
crush the demonstrations started on the 17th of December, 
and on the 22nd of December, after a bloodbath, the Army 
joined the demonstrators in the streets of Bucharest. The 
Ceausescu couple fled the city the same day, only to be 
captured, submitted to a mock trial and made to meet their 
maker in front of a firing squad. 
D. THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY: 1990-
Power was assumed by the National Salvation Front,114 an 
eclectic organization, a self-styled "emanation of the 
healthiest forces of the Revolution," as its manifesto, read 
by its leader Ion Iliescu, put it. 
In its first statement, the Front announced a 
commitment to democratic principles-including a multi-
party system-and the need to organize free elections as 
soon as possible. The Front claimed to represent a 
decisive break with the abhorred Communist regime. 
Next, the Romanian Communist party disappeared without 
a trace from the country's political life. l1S 
The transition to democracy was not to be without 
accidents. Iliescu, a former Party official who fell into 
disgrace in 1971 for "intellectualism," advocated a 
"democratic model without pluralism. "116 His ability to 
114 First appearance in a broadcast on Free Romanian Television, on 
December 23. 
115 Cipkowski, p. 139. 
116 "In this, he was echoing not only Gorbachev's opposition to a 
multi-party system, but also the political philosophy of the NSF's 
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channel the "movement of rage" towards the abuses of the 
"sinister dictator and his heinous wife,,117 and to 
"eliminat[e] the most egregious measures personally 
associated with the sultan, as well as the control over the 
electronic media, granted him and the NSF a landslide 
victory in the 20 May elections."lls One should not downplay 
the extent of support gained even with marginal improvements 
of the standard of living. After the deprivations of the 
Ceausescu era, a "big-bang" approach or shock therapy was 
not extremely popular. The gradual transition with a strong 
safety net (advocated by the NSF) was music to the ears of 
the electorate. It was hard to ignore the fact that people 
who first became active in politics before 1947 led 
"historical parties".1l9 While providing solid democratic 
credentials, their advanced age (sometimes adjoined by a 
long exile) made them sound out of tune with the average 
voter. 
The political stage was effervescent: more than 150 
parties registered, although the majority were ephemeral. 
principal thinker, communist veteran Silviu Brucan, one of the authors 
of the 'Letter of Six.'" Ibid., p. 140. 
117 Comment during the broadcast of the execution of the Ceausescus 
on the Free Romanian Television. 
118 85 percent of the presidential vote, and 66 percent of the 
parliamentary vote. See Linz and Stepan, p. 360. The Parliament was 
actually a Constitutional Assembly, elected for a two year mandate 
(instead of four) to draft a new constitution. 
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Few were of consequence: the Liberals (which are still 
undergoing a process of splintering and realignment), the 
National Peasantists (with a Christian-Democrat addition to 
their doctrine and name), the Magyar Democratic Union of 
Romania, the nationalist parties (Romanian National Unity 
Party, Greater Romania Party), and the Civic Alliance. 12o 
The sultanistic rule left behind "a complete lack 
of ... poli tical society." 121 Political life acquired a 
"ritualized, theatrical character," carried on in the street 
for the best part of 1990 and accompanied by a series of 
outbursts of violence. 122 The most calamitous were 
attributable to the coal miners, and took place in June 1990 
and September 1991. The first incident put an end to a long 
sit-in in the University Square,123 while the second incident 
119 The National Peasantists, the Liberals, and the Social 
Democrats were called "historical parties· to underline their 
continuity. 
120 As the name denotes, a civic association, gathering some of the 
prominent cultural figures and leading intellectuals, but with virtually 
no appeal to the masses, due to its elitist discourse. 
121 "It is one thing to overthrow a dictatorship; it is another to 
participate in the establishment of a democratic public sphere and of 
civil society." Gail Kligman, "Reclaiming the Public: A Reflection of 
Creating civil Society in Romania," in East European Politics and 
Societies 4, no. 3 (1990): 393-437, citation from 410-411 in Linz and 
Stepan, p. 362. 
122 The first occurred on January 29, when NSF supporters conducted 
a rally to counter one by the opposition. A more serious one, borne of 
ethnic tensions, led to bloodshed in Targu-Mures, a city with mixed 
population (Romanian, Hungarian, and Gypsy). The celebration of 15 March 
1848 (when the Hungarian Diet proclaimed the incorporation of 
Transylvania into Hungary) escalated into violent encounters until the 
demonstrators were separated by army detachments. 
123 The sit-in began on 22 April and, for all practical purposes, 
blocked the hub of Bucharest transportation. The miners' violent 
intervention on 14-15 June is widely regarded as the "smoking gun" of 
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ended with the demise of the Petre Roman cabinet (formed 
after the 1990 elections). 
The new constitution was adopted by referendum in 
November 1991. It favored a relative strong presidency. It 
was obvious that in the case of Romania the argument of the 
advocates of parliamentarism (that parliaments have stronger 
democratic credentials than presidential systems) does not 
hold water, at least for the 1990 elections. According to 
the Constitution, the 'President is required to abandon party 
membership before assuming his office. The early adoption of 
the 'Constitution is credited for preventing strong 
institutional struggles, despite an "alarmingly 
confrontational political culture. ,,124 Proportional 
representation (with a 3 percent threshold established since 
the 1992 elections) was both a curse and a blessing: it 
reinforced political fragmentation, but supported the 
integration of the Hungarian minority. 125 
The elections of September 1992 were a quite similar 
story, since president Iliescu won re-election under the new 
constitution and the Social Democracy Party of Romania 
Iliescu's non-democratic behavior (see for instance Linz and Stepan, p. 
361). Precious little is mentioned about the violence perpetrated by the 
demonstrators a day before, when the Romanian TV building, the Police 
and Romanian Intelligence Service headquarters were destroyed and 
burned. The factors behind the 13 June skirmish are unclear. 
124 See Ian Zielonka, "New Institutions in the Old East Bloc, " in 
Diamond and Plattner, pp. 205-224. 
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(SDPR) won a plurality with relative ease. 126 The united 
democratic opposition (the Democratic Convention) was unable 
to mount an united campaign, or to find a prominent 
political figure: Emil Constantinescu, the opposition 
candidate, won only 31 percent of the popular vote to 
Iliescu's 61 percent. The civil society, despite extensive 
democratic assistance from abroad, was still weak, the rule 
of law fragile, and most political tendencies (Social 
Democracy, Liberalism) compromised. To add insult to injury, 
the irredentist discourse by the Hungarian Democratic Union 
boosted the nationalist parties' appeal, and for most of its 
mandate, the SDPR had to rely on support from the 
nationalists and the Labor Socialist Party. 127 
Still, irreversible forces were unleashed, advancing 
Romania to the November 1996 watershed. The opposition 
started to "articulat[e] their views and address relatively 
predictable political constituencies." After 1993, strong 
independent electronic media broke the government monopoly 
on national television, and the extremist print media became 
a marginal phenomenon, while all major newspapers were 
outspoken critics of the government. The economy seemed to 
125 See Jaques Rupni"k, "The Post-totalitarian Blues, " in Diamond 
and Plattner, p. 375. 
126 Containing the bulk of the former NSF, the SDPR was founded 
after a more liberal wing, led by former Premier Roman created the 
Democratic Party (which eventually joined the opposition camp). 
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recover. Moreover, due especially to his quest to be 
recognized as a genuine democrat and thus to enhance 
Romania's odds in the competition for NATO (and EU) 
integration, Iliescu broke his alliance with the 
nationalists. 128 It is worth mentioning that in 1996, after 
countless tribulations, the state treaty with Hungary was 
signed. 129 
According to Tismaneanu, the problems haunting 
democratization in Romania, with possible influence upon the 
outcome of the 1996 elections, were: 
The still low level of civic culture; the fragility of 
the democratic institutions; the inchoate and 
provisional nature of the political parties and their 
ideological preferences; the persistence of a mass 
psychology of nostalgia for collectivist forms of 
social protection; the growing public dissatisfaction 
with the effects of half-hearted reforms; the endurance 
of the communist methods in the functioning of 
important institutions, including the presidency, the 
Supreme Defence Council, the army, the Romanian 
Intelligence Service and the [state-controlled] 
television; and the failure to launch a serious 
discussion of the country's precommunist and communist 
experiences. 130 
127 See Linz and Stepan, pp. 362 - 364. 
128 See Tismaneanu, "Romanian Exceptionalism. .. , " pp. 438-439. 
129 None of the countries wanted to jeopardize its record for NATO 
integration, and having settled all disputes with the neighbors ranked 
quite high among the admission criteria. 
130 Tismaneanu, p. 439. According to Michael Shafir, "Many reforms 
were delayed or stymied or delayed by the 'partocracy-directocracy'- a 
term that analysts have coined to describe the Ceausescu-trained 
managers who run Romania's large state industries and dominate much of 
the country's economic and political life for their own benefit." See 
Michael Shafir, "Romania's Road to 'Normalcy'," Journal of Democracy 
Vol. 8, No.2, April 1997. As I tried to demonstrate, the armed forces 
were actually one of the first societal subsystems to cast off its 
Communist mold. 
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The election outcome signaled a return to normalcy, the 
first time since 1937 that Romanians were changing their 
government by ballot. The Democratic Convention abandoned 
its previous strong anticommunist message, adopting instead 
a "Contract with Romania," which granted them a plurality of 
the votes (30.2 percent for the Chamber of Deputies, 30.7 
for the Senate). They were to form a coalition government 
with Roman's Social Democratic Union (12.9 and 13.2 of the 
vote respectively), and the Magyar Democratic Union (6.6 and 
6.8 percent of the vote). Moreover, Constantinescu won the 
presidency. "The vote was as much a protest against social 
and economic crises as an expression of the mass expectation 
for change. ,,131 
The tasks confronting the new government are, according 
to Tismaneanu: 
To provide the citizens with a sense of their future ... , 
insisting on the need for public debate, implementing 
the rule of law and the separation of powers, and 
repudiating any form of ethnocentric 
self-glorification. 132 
E. CONCLUSION: PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE 
A brief review of the accomplishments of the democratic 
government does not look very encouraging. Apparently, the 
131 Tismaneanu, pp. 440-441. 
132 Ibid. 
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very eclectic composition of the ruling coalition contains 
the seeds of its current ineffectiveness. Precious time has 
been wasted to distributing the cabinet positions (as well 
as the entire central and local administration management 
positions) according to the ill-fated "algorithm." Each 
party is supposed to hold a number of positions 
proportionate to its number of parliamentary seats. This 
process interferes with the proper functioning of the 
ministries, since the minister and its deputies, as well as 
the mid-ranking officials owe their allegiance to different 
parties and try to implement their respective agendas, 
ignoring to a large extent the cabinet's joint program. 
Public opinion is grown weary with the extended patronage 
associated with the algorithm system. 
There have been several cabinet reshuffles, including 
the Premiership.133 The National Peasantists are splinted 
between the former and the incumbent Premiers, both holding 
top party positions. Recrimination between the Peasantists 
and the Social Democrats, on the speed of economic reform, 
makes their co-operation anything but smooth. The Magyar 
Democratic Union, whose co-optation to government was widely 
hailed as a Romanian solution to ethnic disputes, is again 
133 Brightening the prospects for the restoration of political 
stability, by alleviating at least temporarily, the inter-party 
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troubling the waters of Romanian political life .134 The 
economy is in its second year of contraction, with no 
immediate prospect of recovery. 
Romania is now confronted with the phenomenon described 
by Schmitter as "corruption and decay." 
New democracies are usually born in a burst of civic 
enthusiasm and moral outrage against the corrupt 
decadence of the ancien regime, so that the dilemma 
[the point of the peculiar "political economy" 
hampering its legitimacy and perpetuation] only emerges 
later ... Even when the thrust [o'f economic change] is 
toward "unleashing market forces," the process of 
accomplishing this offers very attractive opportunities 
for illicit enrichment on the part of the politicians 
who set the norms, sell tpe enterprises, and award the 
contracts. 135 
According to a very recent study conducted by the 
Institute for Life Standards Research,136 there is a growing 
rift between the average Romanian and the political elite: 
76 percent of the citizens never make contact with officials 
or politicians, 50 percent do not trust politicians, while 
51 percent believe that the commoner is excluded from the 
political process. This phenomenon is connected to a 
decrease in civic interest (compared to year 1990), since 58 
rivalries that have been obstructing reform. See "Romania: Hopes of 
Stabili ty," in The Economist Intelligence Uni t, 11 June 1998. 
134 Especially due to their claim for segregated universities. 
135 Schmitter, pp. 88-89. 
136 Quoted in "Romanii se simt tot mai putin atrasi," in Romania 
Libera, 6 August 1998. 
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percent of the subjects deny any involvement in solving 
local issues. 
The inability of the democratic regime to "deliver 
economic prosperity, honest and efficient government, 
protection for human rights, peace and security, ,,137 bodes 
ill for the chances of democratic consolidation in Romania. 
A reversal to authoritarianism is not an imminent threat. 138 
The most likely outcome is a perennial transition, with no 
consolidation in sight. 
Returning to Linz and Stepan's criteria for democratic 
consolidation, Romania has advanced most on the 
constitutional axis, due to the gradual adapting to conflict 
resolution within the legal framework. 
The behavioral level would come second, since no 
significant actors spend significant resources to achieve 
their objective by creating a nondemocratic regime or 
turning to violence. As far as foreign intervention is 
concerned, one has still to wait until the Magyar Democratic 
Union must desist from involving the Hungarian government in 
Romanian domestic issues. 
The least progress has taken place along the 
attitudinal axis. There is no majority of public opinion 
supporting democratic procedures and institutions, due to 
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declining involvement in politics by the average citizen. 
137 Shin, p.166. 
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v. DOMESTIC SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
This chapter investigates the definition of domestic 
political violence, the current u.s. legal framework for 
military intervention in cases of civilian disturbances, as 
well as the case of the 1992 Los Angeles riots. 
A. CIVILIAN VIOLENCE 
Paul Wilkinson provides an inclusive definition of 
domestic political violence, namely "the illegitimate use or 
threatened use of coercion resulting, or intended to result, 
in death, injury, restraint or intimidation of persons or 
the destruction or seizure of property. 11 139 He identifies 
several recurrent causes of domestic political violence: 
(i) Ethnic conflicts, hatreds, discrimination and 
oppression; 
(ii) Religious and ideological conflicts, hatreds, 
discrimination and oppression; 
(iii) Socio-economic deprivation; 
(iv) Stresses and strains of rapid modernization 
tending to accentuate; 
(v) Perceived political inequalities, infringement of 
rights, injustice or oppression; 
(vi) Lack of adequate channels for peaceful 
communication of protests, grievances and demands (e.g. 
138 See Linz and Stepan, pp. 364-365. 
139 Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State (New York, NY: 
New York University Press, 1986), pp. 23-24. 
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denial of franchise or other rights of participation, 
representation or access to the media); 
(vii) Existence of a tradition of violence, 
disaffection and popular turbulence; 
(viii) The availability of a revolutionary leadership 
equipped with a potentially attractive ideology; 
(ix) Weakness or ineptness of the government, police, 
and judicial organs (e.g. under-reaction, over-
reaction) ; 
(x) Erosion of confidence in the regime, its values and 
institutions afflicting all levels of the population 
including the government; 
(xi) Deep divisions within governing elites and 
leadership groups. 140 
According to Michael Wallace; two features of the 
American polity have shaped a peculiar pattern of collective 
violence. The embracing of the Horatio Alger myth (the 
unqualified opportunity of advancement and prosperity), and 
the quasi-absence--in numerical terms--of violence against 
the state, have kept domestic political violence "informal 
and private." Most frequently, collective violence's 
underlying cause was the inter-group contention for 
political resources. 141 His analysis acknowledges the 
prevalence of inter-group violence, "although in many 
instances the state did aid one of the contending sides, 
almost always the dominant one. ,,142 The state has been 
largely ignored as a source of discontent, due to the 
140 Ibid. , p. 37. 
141 Ibid. , p. 11. 
142 Ibid. I p. 22. 
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vigilante tradition--"taking the law into [one's] own hands" 
--and the influence of the laissez-faire doctrine. 143 
Wallace's taxonomy of civil violence covers three main 
divisions: 
• racial violence, both repressive (e.g. the 1863 
Draft Riots in New York, or the Reconstruction in 
the South) and insurrectionary (the 1935 Harlem 
riots, or the 1960s riots); 
• economic violence, i.e. the "violent suppression of 
labor by capital," the most important being perhaps 
the 1877 railroad strike and 1919 the u.S. Steel 
Strike; 
• ethnic violence, related both to political 
contention among various ethnic groups (election 
riots, like those initiated by the Blood Tubs or the 
Know Nothing groups in Maryland in 1854-1856) and to 
labor disputes triggered by the arrival of new 
immigrant groups (the violent anti-Chinese campaign 
in California between 1871 and 1877) . 
The second type--economic violence--had even left a 
distinctive imprint upon America's urban architecture. A 
great wave of National Guard armory building started after 
143 Ibid., pp. 23-24. 
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the railroad strike of 1887, "a wave that grew out of the 
fears of class warfare that spread over the United States in 
the late nineteenth century. "144 
B. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
1. The Historical Record 
A study dedicated to the topic of domestic employment 
of federal military forces ascertalns that this type of 
mission was one of the topics debated by the Constitutional 
Convention in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787. While 
loathing the idea of the military "as an instrument of 
internal control by a central government," the pre-
independence record led to the 
Corollary, therefore, that any new federal government 
created must have a force sufficient to ensure that its 
laws could be enforced throughout a wide and sparsely 
settled territory, to take care of domestic violence or 
insurrection that a state's constituted authorities 
proved unable to handle, and indeed to settle quarrels 
between the states themselves .145 
The first ninety years after independence witnessed a 
significant amount of involvement of the military in 
144 Robert M. Fogelson, America's Armories: Archi tecture, Society, 
and Public Order (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1989), p. 13. 
145 Robin W. Coakley, The Role of the Federal Mili tary Forces in 
Domestic Disorders 1789-1878 (Washington D.C.: The Center of Military 
History, United States Army, 1988), pp. 3-4. 
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domestic disorders, culminating in the Reconstruction era, 
from 1865 to 1877. 
The operation --or manipulation, according to its 
opponents--of the military in the South, led to the adoption 
on 18 June 1878 of the Knott Amendment, hereinafter called 
the Posse Commitatus Act. 
From and after the passage of this act it shall not be 
lawful to employ any part of the Army of the United 
States as a Posse Commitatus, for the purpose of 
executing the laws, except in such cases and under such 
circumstances as such employment of said force may be 
expressly authorized by the Constitution or by act of 
Congress; and no money appropriated by this act shall 
'be used to pay any of the expenses incurred in the 
employment of any troops in violation of this section 
and any person willfully violating the provisions of 
this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, 
and on conviction thereof shall be punished by fine not 
exceeding ten thousand dollars or imprisonment not 
exceeding two years, or by both such fine and 
imprisonment. 146 
The gist of this doctrine is to discharge any 
discretion by commanders in the field, by putting the 
decision in the hands of the President. He would thus be the 
sole authority allowed to order the employment of federal 
troops in cases of civilian disturbances. "The President's 
power to use both regulars and militia remained undisturbed 
by the Posse Commitatus Act. ,,147 




2. Current Status 
According to the 1993 Bottom-Up Review, "the National 
Guard should be the first line of defense" in cases of 
Military Support to Civil Authorities. 148 
The Guard performs planning and training for civil 
disturbance operations. It is the first military component 
to respond, and remains in state active duty status 
throughout the operation. If the situation requires it, the 
Guard is ordered into federal service. 149 
Emergency operations under federal control (e.g. the 
federalization of the California National Guard during 
the Los Angeles Riots) are conducted under the 
provisions of Title la, USC, are authorized and 
directed by the President or other authorized federal 
officials, and are paid for with federal moneys. 
Federal missions take precedence over state missions. 150 
Supporting state officials and organizations during 
domestic civil emergencies falls under the state active duty 
status division. They are authorized by the state Governor 
or other state officials, conducted under state laws and 
constitutions, and paid by the states (with a potential 
reimbursement by the federal government). The state Adjutant 
148 Roger Allen Brown, William Fedorochko, Jr., and John F. Schank, 
Assessing the State and Federal Missions of the National Guard (Santa 
Monica, California: RAND, 1995), p. 25. 
149 Domestic Support Operations. Field Manual 100-19 and Fleet 
Marine Force Manual FMFM 7-10. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department 
of the Army, U.S. Marine Corps, p. 7-11. 
150 Brown, Fedorochko, and Schank, p. 9. 
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General or other appointed officers of the state National 
Guard exercise control. 151 
Currently, the legal guidelines for the use of the 
federal military and the federalized National Guard152 in 
cases of civil disturbance are provided by two Department of 
Defense directives, DoDD 3025.12 Military Assistance for 
Civil Disturbances (MACDIS) , issued on February 4, 1994, and 
DoDD 3025.15 Military Assistance to civil Authorities, 
issued on February, 18, 1997. The doctrine is stipulated by 
Domestic Support Operations FM 100-19. 
DoDD 3052.12 defines civilian disturbances as 
Group acts of violence and disorders prejudicial to law 
and order in the 50 States, the District of Columbia, 
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, u.S. possessions and 
territories, or any political subdivision thereof. [It] 
includes all domestic conditions requiring the use of 
Federal Armed Forces under this Directive. 153 
The directive states the national and Department of 
Defense policies, sets the responsibility for the management 
of the federal ~esponse to civilian disturbances with the 
Attorney General of the United States. Civilian primacy is 
ensured by the concurrence of two means. First, the 
Department of Defense requests a prior "official request by 
151 Ibid. 
152 Termed federal militia in this type of missions. 
153 See DODD 3052.12 Mili tary Assistance for Civil Disturbances 
(MACDIS), February 4, 1994, in "Washington H. Q. Services, Directives, 
and Records Branch (Directives Section), " available [online] at 
<http://web7.whs.osd.mil/text/d30251p.txt> [10 October 1998], p. 13. 
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State or Federal civil law enforcement or Executive 
authorities" relayed via the Attorney General. Second, the 
President is the sole authority to authorize the employment 
of the military to control civilian disturbances, through an 
Executive order directing the Secretary of Defense to act. iS4 
There are two emergency circumstances entitling DoD 
officials and commanders to act prior to the President's 
authorization, which is to be obtained subsequently: 
(1) When the use of the military forces is necessary to 
prevent loss of life or wanton destruction of property, 
or to restore governmental functioning and public 
order .... 
(2) When duly constituted State and local authorities 
are unable or decline to provide adequate protection 
for Federal property or Federal governmental functions, 
Federal action (including the use of military forces) 
is authorized, as necessary, to protect the Federal 
property or functions. iSS 
The chain of command in cases of civilian disturbances 
is depicted in Figure 1. 
154 Ibid., p. 3. 
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Figure 1. Decision Sequence for Federal Military Law 
Enforcement Support 
Source: Domestic Support Operations. Field Manual & Fleet Marine Force Manual 
(HQ Department of the Army, US Marine Corps, Washington D.C.: 1993), p. 7-13. 
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Operations are conducted under the guidelines provided 
by the Department of the Army civil disturbance plan, dubbed 
"GARDEN PLOT. ,,156 
Federal forces stay always under the military chain of 
command, while civil authority remains unchanged over state 
and local law enforcement agencies. The federal forces 
should be tailored in a manner appropriate to the task at 
hand. 157 
Missions pertinent to the federal forces, i.e. both 
consistent with their organization and training, as well as 
complying with the law, encompass among others: 
• Dispersing unlawful assemblies; 
• Patrolling disturbed areas to prevent unlawful acts; 
• Assisting the distribution of essential goods and 
the maintenance of essential services; 
• Serving as security or quick-reaction forces .158 
An useful checklist of missions appropriate for the 
military in civil disturbances, developed in the aftermath 
of the LA riots by a joint force of military and law 
enforcement personnel, is depicted in Figure 2. 
156 Domestic Support Operations, p. 7-12. 
157 Ibid., p. 7-13. 
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APPROPRIATE State Federal 
Restore Preserve 
Law &: Order Law &: Order 
l. Man traffic control ../ ../ 
points 
2. Provide building ../ ../ ../ (-) 
security 
3 . Escort emergency ../ ../ 
equipment 
4. Provide area ../ ../ 
security, area 
patrols 
5. Provide security at ../ ../ 
custody facilities 
6. Provide security for ../ ../ ../ (-) 
emergency work crews 
7. Protect sensitive ../ ../ ../ (-) 
sites 
8. Transport law ../ ../ 
enforcement personnel 
9. Show of force ../ ../ 
10. Disperse crowds ../ ../ 
1l. Employ riot control ../ ../ 
agents 
12. Provide VIP ../ ../ 
protection, escort 
13. Provide reserve, ../ ../ 
quick-reaction force 
14. Joint patrols, ../ ../ 
ride-alongs 
15. Other missions ../ ../ ../ 
mutually agreed upon 
INAPPROPRIATE 
l. Hostage negotiation ../ ../ ../ 
2. Barricaded suspect ../ ../ ../ 
3. Evidentiary searches ../ ../ ../ 
4. Criminal ../ ../ ../ 
investigation 
Figure 2. Civil Disturbance Mission Tasking Guidelines 
Source: Christopher M. Schnaubelt, "Lessons in Command and Control from 




C. THE 1992 LOS ANGELES RIOTS 
1. Underlying Causes of the Riots 
The 1992 Los Angeles riots were caused by an explosive 
conjunction of factors, with the Rodney King trial sentence 
serving as a primer. Rioting seems a recurring phenomenon in 
Los Angeles, where the black community in Watts exploded in 
an outburst of racial violence in 1965. 159 
Lou Cannon's analysis160 identifies several underlying 
deep phenomena that affected Los Angeles's development but 
went unheeded by the politicians. Mayor Tom Bradley embarked 
upon phantasmal plans envisioning the future of LA as a 
"world city," mirrored into an equally optimistic report, 
"LA 2000-A City for the Future." However, despite its 
pompous tenor, even the report had to admit that the city 
"is rapidly becoming a bimodal society as the number of jobs 
fails to keep up, widening the disparity between high-skill, 
high paying jobs and low-skill, low-paying jobs. ,,161 Cannon 
identifies several causes underlying the downturn of the 
Californian economy: 
159 For a detailed, account, see Governor's Commission on the Los 
Angeles Riots, "Violence in the City-An End or a Beginning?," in 
Anthony Platt, Ed., The Politics of the Riot Commissions: 1917-1970 (New 
York, NY: Collier Books, 1971), pp. 263-286. 
160 Lou Cannon, Official Negligence (New York: Random House, 1997). 
161 Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
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• An extensive and excessive reliance upon defense 
expenditures. The end of the Cold War brought a 
severe curbing of defense procurement, which cost 
California about 300,000 jobs. 
• The collapse of traditional manufacturing, namely 
aerospace and automotive industries, both due to a 
decrease in government orders and to foreign 
competition. 
• A sharp decrease in purchasing power due to the 
replacement of traditional blue-collar jobs by 
lesser-paid apparel manufacturing jobs .162 
One of the areas most plagued by decay was South 
Central Los Angeles, covering nearly forty square miles with 
a population of 630,000 in 1990. In addition to the 
'objective' economic changes upsetting California, South 
Central Los Angeles was affected by demographic and social 
mutations. The population comprised "92 percent ... blacks and 
Latinos, and 230,000 of them lived under the poverty 
line. ,,163 
A particularly disturbing phenomenon in LA is gang-
related crime. As the "LA Style" police street gang manual 
aptly observes "Not only is the citizenry in mortal danger 
162 Ibid., pp. 8-10. 
163 Ibid. I pp. 11-12 and 15. 
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from street gangs, but the influence wielded by the gangs 
has a trickle-down effect on all aspects of life for the 
residents of an area afflicted with a street gang." James 
Delk counted 56 Blood gang sets, 111 Crip, 248 Hispanic, 15 
Asian, as well as 4 other sets. 164 
Law enforcement in Los Angeles County was complicated 
by the existence of 88 cities. Half of them had their own 
police departments, while the other half was policed by the 
LA Sheriff's department. The City of Los Angeles Police 
Department, with 7,900 police officers for a population of 
about 3,5 million, had one of the worst ratios of officers 
to population in major metropolitan areas .165 
While a majority of the population in South Central Los 
"wanted, needed, and deserved police protection," they 
resented contemptuous and prejudiced treatment by the 
police. The "pro-active approach," favored by LA Police 
Chief Daryl F. Gates at the expense of community policing, 
was not apt to build bridges between the police and South 
Central's population. An instance of pro-active policing was 
Operation Hammer, consisting of street sweeps of gang-
infested areas in South Central. Despite the fact that 
164 James D. Delk, Fires & Furies: The LA Riots (Palm Springs, CA: 
ETC Publications, 1995), pp. 15 and 341-355. Major General Delk was the 
CANG deputy adjutant general and acted as Military Field Commander for 
the Los Angeles riots in April-May 1992, until the federalization of the 
Guard. 
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involved "as many as one thousand officers, ... gang killings 
and "assaul ts continued to raise steadily. ,,166 
The violent reaction to the acquittal of four policemen 
involved in the Rodney King beating (for the fifth, a 
mistrial was declared) by the jury in Simi Valley was not 
unexpected. "South Central was ripe for explosion. ,,167 
The dissatisfaction with the trial sentence among the 
black community might have been genuine, but consultations 
among rival gangs with a view to establish a truce and to 
target law enforcement officers took place as well. 168 While 
"looters and shooters ... us red] Rodney King as an excuse to 
rob, pillage, and kill," the most serious threat encountered 
by military and law enforcement were heavily armed members 
of ethnic gangs who sniped at them. 169 
2. The Sequence of Events 
The riot, lasting from the afternoon of April 29 
throughout the morning of May 4, resulted in a casualty list 
of 54 dead and 2,383 injured (221 critically). In addition, 
13,212 were arrested. Damages for Los Angeles County were 
165 Ibid., pp. 7 and 22. 
166 See Cannon, pp. 17-18. 
167 Delk, p. 317. 
168 Ibid., p. 19. 
169 See William W. Mendel, Combat in Cities: The LA Riots and 
Operation Rio (Forth Leavenworth: Foreign Military Studies Office), 
available [online] at <http://leav-www.army.mil/fmso/fmso.htm> [19 
February 1998], p.2. 
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estimated at $717 million. 170 Extensive areas of the county 
were affected: the cities of Los Angeles, Inglewood, 
Compton, Pasadena, West Hollywood, Carson, and Long Beach.171 
The sequence of events is shown in Figure 3. 
170 Ibid., p. 2. 
171 See Christopher M. Schnaubelt, "Lessons in Conunand and Control 








1515 Acquittal verdicts announced in the trial of police officers 
accused of beating Rodney King. 
1850 Rioters beat and nearly kill truck driver Reginald Denny as a 
television crew captures both the horror of the incident and 
the absence of Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officers. 
Hundreds of arson and looting incidents begin. 
2100 The California governor's office informs the adjutant general 
that the governor has decided to mobilize (call to state active 
















request of the LA mayor. 
A dusk-to-dawn curfew is imposed in large portions of the city 
of LA and the surrounding county. 
Approximately 2,000 CANG soldiers have reported to armories. 
Los Angeles County requests 2,000 more CANG personnel; the 
governor approves the request. 
Ammunition from Camp Roberts (in central California) arrives in 
LA area via CA-47 helicopter. 
The first CANG elements (two military police companies) deploy 
in support of the LAPD and the LA Sheriff's Department (LASD). 
About 1,000 CANG troops are currently deployed "on the street," 
with 1,000 more prepared to deploy and awaiting mission 
requests from law enforcement agencies. 
LAPD and LASD request 2,000 additional CANG troops, for a total 
of 6,000. 
Perceiving the CANG deployment to be slow, the governor 
requests federal troops. 
The President agrees to deploy 4000 federal troops to LA. 
Approximately 1,220 CANG soldiers are deployed in support of 
LAPD; 1,600 are deployed in support of LASD; and 2,700 are in 
reserve awaiting missions. 
Active component Marines from Camp Pendleton, California, begin 
arriving in the LA area via C-141 convoy. 
Commander, Joint Task Force-Los Angeles (JTF-~) arrives in LA 
area. 
Active component soldiers from Ft. Ord, California, begin 
arriving in the LA area via C-141 aircraft. 
The President announces that the CANG will be federalized. 
Final plane with active component soldiers arrives. 
Approximately 6,150 CANG troops are deployed on the street, 
with 1,000 more in reserve; 1,850 soldiers from the 7th 
Infantry Division are in staging areas; Marines prepare for 
deployment. 
1900 First active component troops deploy on the street; a battalion 
of Marines replaces 600 CANG soldiers. 
2359 More than 6,900 CANG soldiers are deployed, with 2,700 more in 
reserve. Approximately 600 Marines are deployed, but most 
active component Army and Marine Corps personnel remain in 
staging areas. 
9 May 1200 CANG reverts to state status, ending federalization; active 
component forces begin redeploying home. 
13- CANG releases troops from state active duty, returning them to 
27 May "part-time" status. 
Figure 3. Chronology of the 1992 Los Angeles Riots. 
Source: Compiled from Harrison (1992), Delk (1995), and various CANG 
after-action reports. From Schnaubelt, p. 91. 
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Riot suppression involved law enforcement agencies 
(local, state, and federal), the National Guard, and the 
federal military. The response was poorly coordinated, 
police reaction was delayed, and command and control were 
far from optimal. The decision to employ federal troops, and 
subsequently to federalize the National Guard, was 
considered by many as unnecessary and leading to an 
inefficient use of manpower and assets. 
The Mutual Aid system, designed to provide assistance 
between neighboring law enforcement jurisdictions, was 
improperly employed during the riots. A timely co-operation 
and co-ordination between the LAPD, the LA Sheriff 
Department, and the California Highway Patrol, might have 
made a difference. The LAPD was the weak link in the chain, 
due to several deficiencies, the most notable being poor 
command exercised by Police Chief Gates. The Webster report 
noted among others: 
1. Neither the City nor LAPD prepared specific plans in 
enough detail to deal with the disturbance .... A Master 
Plan, with comprehensive inter-departmental plans, 
involving all City departments, is required for 
responses to any reasonably probable contingency. Plans 
must address tactics, command and control, logistics, 
and communications. 
2. An investment is needed in modern emergency 
equipment for the Police Department .172 
172 Delk, p. 295. William H. Webster, former Director of the FBI, 
and later of the CIA, headed the "Office of the Special Advisor to the 
Board of Police Commissioners, City of Los Angeles," which submitted the 
2-volume "Webster Report," on October 21, 1992. 
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According to a senior law enforcement official, 
"National Guard troops were requested by the Mayor and 
committed by the governor before a law enforcement mutual 
aid request occurred," while the LAPD was not ready to 
receive any assistance .173 
Leadership was plagued by rivalries between Mayor 
Bradley and Chief Gates, between Gates and Sheriff Sherman 
Block, as well as by the schism between Governor Pete Wilson 
and the Adjutant General of the California National Guard, 
Maj or General Bob Thrasher. 174 
The California National Guard (CANG) was called on the 
second day of the riot, deploying ultimately 10,456 soldiers 
and airmen from the 40th Infantry Division and from the Air 
National Guard. 175 
Due to a perceived slowness in deployment, on the third 
day the federal forces were called-for. Actually, deployment 
was quick. The guardsmen were committed in 17 hours, faster 
than regulations provide for. 176 The CANG mobilization was 
173 Dr. Richard Andrews, Director of the Office of Emergency 
Services, cited in Delk, pp. 297-298. 
U4 See Mendel, p. 4. 
175 3 Brigades (5 Infantry and 4 Armor Battalions), 1 Military 
Police Brigade (2 Battalions), the Division Artillery (3 Battalions), 
and Support Command (3 Battalions) of the 40 th Infantry Division 
(Mechanized) were deployed. The California Air National Guard provided 
an Airlift Wing (C130), a Rescue Group (Security Police), a Recon Group 
(Security Police), and a Fighter Wing (Security Police). In addition, 
the State Area Command HQ was employed. See Mendel, p. 3. 
U6 See Delk, p. 304, and Mendel, p. 3. 
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L....-___________________________________________ _ 
excellent, but logistics and security problems hindered 
deployment. 
The deployment of federal forces, 2,023 troops from the 
7th Infantry Division and 1,508 Marines from Camp Pendelton, 
and the' subsequent federalization of the Guard, via the 
Joint Task Force-Los Angeles (JTF-LA), led to two 
unwarranted outcomes. l77 First, it made "the Guard ... about 80% 
less responsive supporting law enforcement agencies," due to 
an improper understanding of the Posse Commitatus Act. 
Second, it somewhat blurred the Rules of Engagement. 178 
Until federalization, the CANG established an operation 
cell at the Los Angeles Emergency Operation Center (EOC). 
The absence of a unified law enforcement chain of command 
forced the Guard to respond both to LAPD and LA Sheriff 
Department requests. The former flooded the CANG officials 
with demands for large numbers of troops without specific 
missions in mind, while the latter exercised far more 
restraint asking for fewer troops for specific missions. 179 
Operating within areas coincident with the areas of 
responsibility of the supported law enforcement agency, the 
177 The 7th Infantry Division (Light), deployed a Military Police 
Company, Aviation elements, 1 Brigade HQ, 3 Infantry Battalions, a 
Support Command HQ, and one Support Battalion. The Marine Air-Ground 
Task Force comprised 1 Marine Battalion, 1 Light Armored Battalion, 1 
Military Police Battalion, Engineer elements, and Marine Air Group 
elements. See Mendel, pp. 3-4. 
178 Ibid., p. 4. 
TI9 Schnaubelt, p. 97. 
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CANG was able to provide the required. co-ordination. CANG 
troops deployed in units tailored for the mission--the squad 
being the unit of choice--and thus allowing for 
flexibility. 180 
Under the Presidential Order of May 1st, the military 
were directed to "restore law and order in and about the 
City and County of Los Angeles, and other districts of 
California." The National Guard, assisting a imposing law 
enforcement contingent (5,000 LAPD officers and 4,000 
additional police officers from agencies across the state)181 
had already accomplished this mission before their arrival. 
The assumption of command by the JTF-LA had three major 
consequences. 182 First, the JTF redefined the areas of 
operations using more identifiable lines on the map. The 
flip side was that the lines had no operational relevance, 
so formations had to support several police areas, or 
leaders of police areas had to deal with mUltiple units 
supporting their bureaus. 
Second, due to a peculiar interpretation of the Posse 
Commitatus, Major General Marvin Covault, commander of JTF-
LA, assumed that maintaining law and order (as opposed to 
restoring them) fell beyond the limits of his mandate. 
180 Ibid., pp. 98 and 102-103." 
181 Ibid., pp. 99-100. 
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Therefore, he started'to test each request for assistance to 
determine whether it was a law enforcement or a military 
function. Most of the requests for assistance were 
subsequently turned down. As an adjoining measure, missions 
were subjected to a fastidious validation process, in case 
of changing circumstances (changing location while 
performing a task, such as crossing a street). 
Third, the JTF-LA emphasized control and thus deployed 
larger units for similar missions (e.g. two platoons instead 
of two squads), increasing the effort. 
The extraction of federal forces was slowed down to a 
certain extent by subtle pressures from law enforcement 
agencies and the general public, all too happy to see the 
crime level cut in half after four days of military presence 
in the streets. The JTF-LA response was to indiscriminately 
cancel current missions, thus leaving no adjustment time to 
law enforcement agencies. 
3. Lessons Learned 
The social roots of future civilian disturbances were 
not eliminated with the end of the riots. "The riots hit an 
area already severely depressed ... there have been not enough 
182 Ibid., pp. 100-103. 
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improvements since then. ,,183 Maybe the single bright event 
was the adoption of community policing. 184 
Several lessons might be drawn from the 1992 LA riots, 
insofar as the police, National Guard, and federal forces 
are concerned. 
Delk identified several areas of interest: 
--Arming Orders. [R]estrictions should normally be 
used only when working with extremely green troops, 
or when the threat is almost nil. Neither was the 
case in South Central Los Angeles. 
-- Communications. 
--Training. The only additional training that may have 
been desirable ... is what is called . .Military Operations 
in Urban Terrain. 
--Intelligence. Military intelligence is predictive, 
versus the event-oriented intelligence normally used 
by the police. 
-- Deployment scheme, The National Guard took the 
streets back from the gangs ... by literally blanketing 
the affected area with Guardsmen. 18S 
One lesson drawn from the riots and provided in the FM 
100-19 manual pertains to the areas of operation: 
A deployed unit's area of operation should coincide 
with the jurisdiction or subdivision boundaries of the 
law enforcement agency it supports. 18G 
According to Mendel, planning and exercising for civil 
disturbance contingencies, trained civilian leaders, 
effective interagency co-operation, better equipment 
183 See Delk, p. 325. 
184 See Cannon, p. 589. 
185 Delk, pp. 321-323, emphasis in the original. 
186 Domestic Support Operations, p. 7-14. 
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(radios, protective gear, and weapons of lesser lethality) 
are critical. 187 
At the operational level, Mendel argues for a service-
support role for the federal forces, advocating an improved 
physical and legal endowment for the National Guard, as it 
is better suited for coping with civil disturbances. Both 
training and legal restrictions put too much strain upon 
Federal Forces to allow them to cope properly with such 
contingencies. 188 This conclusion might be appropriate to the 
LA riots, but in this students' opinion, there are at least 
two reasons limiting its validity. 
First, while more restrictive than for the National 
Guard, the legal framework governing federal forces is more 
permissive than Brigadier General Covault's interpretation. 
There are two constitutional exceptions allowing the 
military to execute or enforce the law: to protect civilian 
property and functions and to protect federal property and 
functions. At times of "sudden and unexpected civil 
disturbance ... the federal government may use military force to 
prevent loss of life or wanton destruction of property and 
to restore government functions and public order. ,,189 
187 See Mendel, p. 6. 
188 Ibid., p. 12. 
189 See Domestic Support Operations, pp. 3-1 and 3-2. 
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Second, if National Guard forces are not able to cope 
with a particular situation, waiving the option of employing 
federal forces seems an improper course of events. 
A topical issue for military assistance for civil 
disturbances, as a type of Military Operation Other Than 
War, is operational control versus tactical initiative. Due 
to political considerations, the degree of operational 
control is sensibly higher than in combat, at the expense of 
tactical initiative. Difficulties in monitoring the 
operation's progress, as well as the potential negative 
outcome of blunders even at small-unit level, present the 
commander with incentives to retain as much control as 
possible. 19o 
D. CONCLOSION 
The particular historic development of the United 
States has validated the use of the military as a reliable 
instrument for the federal and state governments to deal 
with domestic violence and insurrection. On the other hand, 
the prevalent loathing of military law enforcement has led 
to the implementation of several legal safeguards to 
preserve civilian control over the military. The most 
meaningful of them is the Posse Commitatus Act of 1878. 
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Currently, a comprehensive body of laws governs the 
employment of the military. Civilian disturbances are dealt 
with a three-level approach, using civilian law enforcement 
agencies, the National Guard (both in state and federal 
missions), and the federal military. The military is 
employed at the request of pertinent civil authorities, in 
cases when law enforcement agencies are overwhelmed by the 
situation. 
Military Assistance to civil Authorities and Military 
Assistance to Civil Disturbances, as Military Operations 
Other Than War, pose several strains upon the military. In 
order to be effective, certain requirements have to be met: 
• Establishing appropriate co-operation between the 
military and the civilian law enforcement agencies 
in the field. 
• A thorough evaluation of the operational context, 
adjoined by the mastering of the legal restraints. 
• Setting the balance between operational control and 
tactical initiative. 
• Providing proper equipment and training. 
190 See Schnaubel t, p. 106. 
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VI. THE USE OF THE MILITARY IN CASES OF 
CIVILIAN VIOLENCE IN ROMANIA 
This chapter investigates the two most recent cases of 
employment of the armed forces in dealing with civil 
disturbances, specifically the December 1989 Revolution and 
the September 1991 events. The cur~ent structures and 
procedures employed in civil disturbances will be compared. 
The legal framework will be analyzed to discern whether the 
means and ends are connected. 
A. THE DECEMBER 1989 REVOLUTION 
1. Background 
The December 1989 events present the observer with a 
complex phenomenon, initiated as a mass upheaval, and ending 
as an urban guerilla action against an enemy yet to be 
detected. In addition to the population and the armed 
forces, two other protagonists were involved: the Security 
troops, and the yet-unidentified terrorist elements. 
The Communist regime in Romania relied upon the 
paramilitary forces controlled by the Ministry of Interior's 
Directorate for Security Troops (Comandamentul Trupelor de 
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Securitate) for its survival. A paramilitary elite force, 
organized like motorized rifle units, equipped with small 
arms, artillery, and armored personnel carriers, the 
Security troops were specially trained to fulfill domestic 
missions. Their personnel were selected from the same pool 
as the armed forces. Virtually all men over eighteen were 
eligible. The term of service was two years (as opposed to 
sixteen months with the ground forces). In 1989, about 
20,000 conscripts served with the Security troops.191 
Figure 4 depicts the organization of the Ministry of 
Interior in the 1980s. 
191 See Soper, pp. 276 and 302. 
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MINISTER OF INTERIOR 
I I 
DIR. DIR. DIR. DIR. DIR. NATIONAL 
FOR FOR FOR FOR PENI- FOR FIRE- COMMISSION 
MILITIA SECURITY STATE TENTIARIES FIGHTING FOR VISAS 
(POLICE) TROOPS ARCHIVES AND PASSPORTS 
DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE SECURITY 
GENERAL DIR. DIR. DIR. SERVICE K DIR. 
FOR TECHNICAL FOR SURVEI- FOR FOR MAIL 
OPERATIONS LLANCE INTERNAL CENSORSHIP 
SECURITY 
DIR. DIR. IV DIR. V DIR. 
FOR COUNTER- FOR 
ESPIONAGE INVESTI-
GATIONS 
Figure 4. Organization of the Ministry of Interior, 19805 
Source: Karl W. Soper, "National Security," in Ronald D. Bachman, 
Romania: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1991), p. 300. Dir. stands for Directorate. 
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Directly responsible through the Minister of Interior 
to the Romanian Communist Party General Secretary, the 
Security troops guarded important installations of the Party 
and state structures, as well as communication centers. They 
were supposed to protect the regime against demonstrations, 
strikes, and riots, as well as against a military coup 
d'etat. To that end, they were subjected to intense 
political indoctrination as well as to stricter discipline 
than the armed services. Their standard of living was higher 
as well, a weighty advantage in the late 1980s Romania. 192 
2. The Sequence of Events 
This account of the events is drawn from a 
comprehensive inquiry, "The Romanian Army in the December 
1989 Revolution," which collected data from the mission 
registries of all involved units, as well as from the 
Republic Attorney General's office (military branch) and the 
special Senate Committee investigations .193 
The events can be divided in two major phases: the 
initial phase, that is the Revolution proper, from 16 to 22 
December, and the consolidation phase, between 22 and 26 
192 Ibid., pp. 302 and 304. 
193 See Gen. (ret.) Costache Codrescu, Ed., Arma ta Romana fn 
Revolutia din Decembrie 1989: studiu Documentar - Preliminar (Bucharest: 
Editura Militara, 1994). In Romanian, the term Army refers not to the 
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December, when the Army together with units of the Ministry 
of the Interior, fought terrorist elements. The dividing 
point is provided by the attempted escape of Nicolae 
Ceausescu and his wife, which put an end, for all practical 
means, to Communist rule in Romania. Throughout the events, 
insidious external interference was detected, but it 
occurred more frequently in the second phase. 
The Revolution began in the city of Timisoara, as a 
protest movement against the forced eviction of Laszlo 
Tokes, a Magyar priest, on the evening of December 16. Using 
the cover of the peaceful demonstration, violent elements 
inflicted wanton destruction in the downtown area, providing 
an excuse for a forceful showdown by the Ministry of 
Interior. 
On December 17, columns of unarmed soldiers were 
marching to deter another burst of violence, when they were 
attacked by violent groups of protestors. At 1100, on orders 
of the Minister of National Defence, Division General Vasile 
Milea, several units, with tanks and armored personnel 
carriers, were deployed to cordon the downtown area and 
major administration headquarters and economic institutions. 
ground forces, but to the all three armed services. This will be the 
meaning employed in this chapter. 
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Later the same the day, Ceausescu ordered a meeting of 
the C.P.Ex. (Political Executive Committee--the highest 
party decision body) to endorse his decisions. The "actions" 
were supposed to be crushed within an hour, by a determined 
use of force. 
After the assault on the 18th Mechanized Division 
headquarters and some arson attempts, a state of emergency 
was declared and live ammunition was distributed to the 
troops at 1800. 
The night of December 17 witnessed violent 
confrontations between groups throwing missiles and 
firebombs and wielding crowbars, and the troops. The attacks 
were directed mainly against servicemen and military 
equipment. In isolated cases, soldiers fired their weapons 
in self-defense. This provided a cover for plainclothes 
agents, most of them mingling with the crowd, to open fire 
against the protestors. 
After reinforcement were brought from several 
neighboring garrisons and the order of battle was revised, 
only minor skirmishes took place on December 18. The Army 
employed tear gas for riot control, and that proved quite 
ineffective. 
On December 19, a total reversal of the situation took 
place. All industrial works in the cities stopped their 
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operations, and workers started gathering in downtown 
Timisoara. 
The chief of the General Staff, Major General Stefan 
Gus-, dispatched to Timisoara on December 17 to organize the 
repression, promised the workers of one factory a total 
withdrawal of the troops. On December 20, at 1200, he 
decided unilaterally to do that, a decision endorsed by the 
Minister of Defence. This took place at a time when 
Ceausescu was still at the helm, and his orders were clear: 
swift suppression, by using any means available. 
The military opened their ranks, allowing the 
protestors to enter the Opera building. Fraternization 
between the servicemen and the revolutionaries took place. 
Some features of the events of December 17-20 in 
Timisoara are of specific interest. 
The units of Timisoara garrison were under 
informational pressure, signaling an impending invasion from 
the West (specifically by Hungary) ,194 as well as under 
stress due to attack by recklessly violent groups. Some of 
them instigated the servicemen to mutiny. Twelve servicemen 
were injured; eight of them shot by unidentified persons. 
The Army was assigned missions pertaining to the 
security of military installations, State and political 
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offices, and major economic sites. The military were 
assigned to block communication avenues. Heavy equipment 
(tanks, armored personnel carriers) was deployed with a view 
to deter aggressive groups. Carrying no ammunition or 
mounted infantry, several isolated tanks were destroyed by 
the protestors. 
The military opened fire only in self-defense and, most 
of the times, by observing the rules of engagement. 195 Due to 
the disposition of forces adopted, Army units were combined 
with Ministry of Interior forces (Securitate troops, Militia 
officers, and counter-terrorist sub-units, with some 
officers in plainclothes) .196 The latter opened fire on 
several occasions. This disposition has later led to 
allegations of excessive use of firepower by the Army, 
holding it responsible for some of the civilian fatalities. 
The presence of the chief of the General Staff 
exercised a restraining influence. Minimal force was 
employed for protection missions (between 15 and 20 percent 
of the available personnel and equipment). The rules of 
engagement were strictly enforced, and Major General Gus-
194 Intelligence reports signaled the deployment of formations 
close to the border. 
195 Two warnings, warning shot, shot at legs. 
196 Militia was the name of the police under Communist rule in 
Romania. The special counter-terrorist unit, Unitatea Speciala de Lupta 
Antiterorista, was established in the late 1970s with German assistance, 
under the model of the GSG-9. Later, its repertoire was extended to 
include riot suppression. 
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decided single-handedly to cease hostilities and withdraw 
troops to barracks. 
The alleged presence of foreign agent provocateurs can 
be inferred from several facts: ammunition non-existent in 
Romanian inventory, well planned and coordinated assaults of 
military installations and equipment by small groups, 
usually at the cover of darkness. 197 
The events initiated in Timisoara forced Ceausescu to 
adopt measures to prevent the spread of the protest. 
On December 21, the C.P.Ex. decided to stage a massive 
rally in front of the Party Central Committee headquarters 
in Bucharest, striving to display the complete support of 
the people for the leader. The plan backfired. The 
manifestation turned into a massive protest against the 
dictator, who panicked. An emergency staff, composed of the 
Minister of Defence, General Tudor Postelnicu, the Ministry 
of Interior and General Iulian Vlad, the chief of the State 
Security Department, under Ceausescu's direct control, was 
supposed to direct the containment and eventual suppression 
of the protest movement. 
Fierce confrontations took place on the night of 
December 21 in the University Square between groups of 
protestors and joint forces of the Ministry of Interior and 
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Army. After unsuccessful attempts to disperse the crowd with 
water cannons and tear gas, firearms were used. Again, the 
disposition of forces--police, Securitate troops, 
plainclothes Interior officers, army--put the Army at a 
disadvantage. Interior forces were able to fire on the 
protestors unobserved by using the cover provided by the 
Army troops firing over the crowd. The Army could not fire 
at the crowd, since all Army detachments were protected by 
one or two rows of police and security troops with body 
shields. Eventually, at 0300 the situation was under 
relative control. 
In the morning of December 22, massive groups of 
demonstrators joined forces in front of the Central 
Committee building. At 0910, the Minister of Defence ordered 
the Army forces protecting the building not to open fire on 
the protestors. After an argument with Ceausescu, General 
Milea committed suicide. His first deputy, Lieutenant-
General Victor St-nculescu, ordered the troops back to 
barracks at 1045. The Army fraternized again with the 
demonstrators, who called the military to join their march 
to the Television headquarters. At 1200, Ceausescu and his 
wife Elena left the building by helicopter to organize a new 
197 At the time, the arms control regime in Romania was draconian, 
so the very existence of firearms among protestors is at least suspect. 
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center of resistance in Targoviste, less than 100 kilometers 
from Bucharest. 
The first phase ended in confusion, but the pandemonium 
was yet to come. 
Again, this time due to the opposition of the Ministry 
of Defence, the Army exercised remarkable restraint. Apart 
from the garrison comprising the 4th Tank Division, the 1st 
Motorized Rifle Division, and the 1st Paratrooper Regiment, 
several units were brought as reinforcement. Despite this 
significant military presence, the fatality count remained 
relatively low. The most remarkable phase ended with the 
Army fraternizing with the revolutionaries, while the police 
and Securitate troops were regarded as the main culprit for 
the civilian death count. 
Similar events took place in most of Romania's cities, 
even though the level of violence was significantly lower. 
The second phase of the Revolution started with an 
urban guerilla fraction opposing the Army to unidentified 
terrorist elements in Bucharest and several cities. In 
addition, the Air Defense Command and the Signal Command 
were subjected to electronic warfare, while the media was 
flooded with intoxication. Cities other than Bucharest where 
clashes took place were strategically located or were major 
garrisons. By depicting the Ministry of Interior troops as 
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terrorists, the propaganda warfare aimed to provoke a final 
showdown and eventually a civil war. In order to avoid this 
situation, the newly installed power (the Council of the 
National Salvation Front) ordered the Ministry of National 
Defence to take under control all paramilitary forces. 
Due to lack of training for urban warfare (a 
significant part of the soldiers were in their first month 
of training) as well as to the propaganda warfare, several 
incidents led to fratricide fire. In a much-publicized case, 
two USLA light armored cars, sent to reinforce the 
protection of the Ministry of National Defence headquarters, 
were destroyed by an Army tank that had precisely the same 
mission. In other occasions, servicemen and officers fell to 
terrorist fire or were caught in crossfire. The incidents 
reached a climax prior to December 25, when the Ceausescus 
were executed. After the execution, the incidents declined 
steeply, and eventually ended on December 31st . 
3. Conclusion 
The December 1989 events proved that a regime perceived 
as illegitimate by the majority of the popUlation could not 
survive in Romania, even by using the force of arms. The 
Army defected, and the Securitate was not willing to engage 
the Army in open warfare. 
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The Army passed the test with flying colors. They 
executed resolutely the mission ordered by the new 
authorities, despite their lack of training. Of 1,104 
fatalities 221 were military, as well as 633 of the 
casualties. 19B The majority of the casualties were inflicted 
after December 22. While the gallantry of the military was 
outstanding, training and equipment for urban warfare left 
much to be desired. 
The idea of employing the armed forces in civilian 
disturbances became unpopular with the political sector, and 
it was never in favor with the Army officer corps. In 
addition, two developments reinforced this negative 
perception among the officer corps. First, several officers 
were brought into military tribunals for their activity 
during the Revolution. Since performing orders that were 
legitimate at the time of their issuance could entail legal 
liability later, few officers wanted to contemplate a 
similar situation. 
Furthermore, the legal framework was subjected to 
extensive revision, restrictive and anti-democratic laws 
being abrogated by hundreds. The Constitution was suspended, 
and a bill of rights type declaration by the Council of the 
National Salvation Front served as substitute for a time. 
198 The Ministry of Interior casualties' list included 52 deaths, 
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Second, the paramilitary troops being absorbed by the 
Army, they were not available for quelling civilian violence 
anymore. The single instrument available for this type of 
mission was the Militia, promptly returned to its prewar 
name (Politia). It took more than a cosmetic change to gain 
credibility from the public, since its record was tarnished 
by countless, albeit most of them minor, abuses. 
B. THE SEPTEMBER 1991 INCIDENTS 
1. Circumstances 
The violence of June 13-15 1990 clashes led to a 
different approach. On the June 13, demonstrators attending 
a long sit-in protest in University Square (downtown 
Bucharest) reacted violently to an attempted evacuation by 
the police. Criminal elements and agent provocateurs, 
infiltrated among the protestors, inflicted wanton 
destruction. The National Television building, the Bucharest 
Police HQ, and the Romanian Intelligence Service (the 
Securitate successor) HQ suffered extensive destruction. 
President Ion Iliescu issued a public appeal to law-abiding 
citizens, mostly to the industrial workers, which were his 
electoral base. The strongest reaction carne from the 
and 52 wounded. 
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coalminers from the Jiu Valley basin. They resorted to 
indiscriminate beatings of anyone suspected of being an 
opponent of the regime. At least two deaths were recorded, 
as well as numerous wounded. The miners left the capital 
city only on June 16, with the distinct feeling of being the 
saviors of the regime, and thus entitled to special 
privileges. 199 That, despite the fact that at their arrival, 
the police, supported by Army units (namely paratroopers at 
the Television building, and a detachment from a mechanized 
division, both without live ammunition) were already in 
control. 
The Roman government decided to re-establish the 
Gendarmerie corps, a paramilitary force that existed until 
the Communist takeover of Romania. The infrastructure used 
was that of the former Securitate troops. The new corps was 
In charge of protecting the country's democratic 
institutions and of course of intervening when these 
are placed in jeopardy by the pressure of street 
demonstrations against the state order and when the 
capabili ty of the police is overtaxed. 200 
The new corps was to suffer its battle test during the 
September 1991 events. 
199 See "Miners Leave Bucharest after pro-Government Rampage," in 
The Reuters Library Report, 15 June 1990, available [Lexis/Nexis}: 
NEWS/ARCNEWS [13 September 1998}, and "Romanian Miners Questioned On 
June Violence," in The Reuters Library Report, 13 July 1998, available 
[Lexis/Nexis}: NEWS/ARCNEWS [13 September 1998}. 
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2. The Sequence of Events 
The 1991 riots were sparked by an inept handling of a 
labor dispute between the pit coal miners trade unions in 
Jiu Valley and the Government, against the background of a 
"sharp drop in living standards, [with] inflation ... running at 
170 percent. ,,201 
The miners were not satisfied with the settlement 
negotiated with Prime Minister Petre Roman and government 
representatives on September 17, although all their claims 
were satisfied. The trade union in Petrosani staged a 
general strike, demanding the arrival of the Premier as well 
as of a parliamentary delegation. 202 
Infuriated by the Premier's refusal to comply with 
their demands, the miners, led by Miron Cosma, their trade 
union headman, hijacked trains and forced the mechanics to 
carry them to Bucharest. 
Miners arrived in three waves to Bucharest, on 
September 24-26, with a single purpose in mind: "The 
200 See "New Law on Gendarme Force Advocated," Dimineata, 4 
January 1991, FBIS Daily Report-East Europe, Romania, 7 February 1991 
(FBIS-EEU-91-026), p. 34. 
201 "Fatal Rioting Spurs Changes in Romania,· St. Louis Post-
Dispatch, 26 September 1991, available [Lexis-Mexis]: NEWS/ARCNEWS [17 
February 1998]. 
202 See "Jiu Valley Miners Stage General Strike 23 September," 
ROMPRES, 23 September 1991, FBIS Daily Report-East Europe, Romania, 24 
September 1991 (FBIS-EEU-91-185), p. 23, and "Roman Addresses Parliament 
on Miners' Disturbance," Bucharest Programul Unu Radio Network, 25 
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dismissal of the government and of the Prime Minister from 
his position. ,,203 
The miners, joined by groups of opposition protestors 
stormed the Government building in Victoria Square, 
undeterred by the tear gas and concussion bombs employed by 
the Gendarmes and the Service for Dignitaries' Protection 
(SPP) .204 The cabinet was evacuated by the back door, while 
the miners set the fist floor on fire. A firebomb killed one 
Gendarmerie serviceman. 205 
The Army deployed detachments of military police, 
mounted on armored personnel carriers and tanks, but they 
were not issued live ammunition. 
Other assaults took place at the Television building 
(where the Gendarmerie units were able to repeal the 
attacks), and at the Chamber of Representatives, where Cosma 
September 1991, FBIS Daily Report- East Europe, Romania, 26 September 
1991 (FBIS-EEU-91-187), p. 22. 
203 Declaration by Cosma in a news conference. He seems to have 
regarded the fact that the Premier did not visit the Jiu Valley as a 
personal offence, and toppling the government was his way of redress. 
See "Miners Demand Government's Resignation," Bucharest Programul Unu 
Radio Network, 26 September 1991, FBIS Daily Report- East Europe, 
Romania, 26 September 1991 (FBIS-EEU-91-187), p. 29. 
204 Created in 1990 as an independent unit with the Ministry of 
National Defence, the SPP (Serviciul pentru Protectie si Paz§) became an 
independent executive agency, with its own intelligence unit. It is 
subordinated to the President and controlled by the SCND. 
205 See Vasile Surcel, "Maiorul Gabor, 8 Ani de Puscarie," 
Evenimentul Zilei, 12 July 1998, available 
[online] :<http://www.expres.ro/press/evzilei/investigatii.htm> [7 July 
1998], p. 2. 
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managed to enter the building with his comrades, and even 
addressed the session. 206 
The Premier handed his resignation on the evening of 25 
September, but this had little bearing upon the miners' 
violent actions. In the same emergency meeting of the 
Supreme Council for National Defence when Roman resigned, 
several measures were adopted to quell the riots. In 
accordance with the decision by the SCND, the Ministry of 
National Defence took several measures: 
• To raise the combat capability in all military 
commands and large [formations] throughout the 
country; 
• To distribute [live] ammunition to all small units 
that are guarding the government and public 
buildings, to be used if needed under legal 
conditions. 
• To redeploy troops to meet requirements to ensure 
the protection of state institutions in accordance 
with the sittiation that has been created. 
• To make operational the Army's transmission 
sys tern. 207 
This communique, repeated several times by Radio and 
TV, as well as the tougher stance by the SPP at Cotroceni 
Palace (the Presidential office building), where the 
protestors were repealed with rubber bullets and armored 
cars, put the miners to flight. 208 
32. 
206 "Miners' Leader Cosma, Legislative Leaders Meet,· ibid., p. 30. 
207 See ·Communique on Defense Ministry Measures Issued," ibid., p. 
208 See "Troops Disperse Demonstrators at Cotroceni Palace," 
Bucharest Programul Unu Radio Network, 25 September 1991, FBIS Daily 
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Cosma lost control over some of his hordes. While he 
was negotiating at Cotroceni with President Iliescu, groups 
of miners were still attacking and pillaging. 
The riots came to an end after Cosma and the President 
concluded an agreement that satisfied all the miners' 
demands. The miners' resolve was already shattered by the 
use of live ammunition against them at the Television 
building. By September 27, most of the miners had returned 
to Petrosani. 
3. Conclusion 
The 1991 riots made evident the flaws of the existing 
approach to quelling civilian disturbances. Another Romanian 
government fell in less than two years at the hands of 
demonstrators. This time it was an elected one, and it fell 
due to the violent acts of a tiny fraction of the 
population. 
The security apparatus, particularly the Gendarmerie 
troops, was unable to prevent the miners' transit to 
Bucharest due to: 
• Slowness in deployment and concentration of forces. 
Report- East Europe, Romania, 27 September 1991 (FBIS-EEU-91-188), p. 
37. 
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• Obvious imbalance in numbers between rioters and 
Gendarmes. 
• Inadequacy of riot control equipment (truncheons, 
tear gas, concussion bombs) against rioters wielding 
crowbars, shovel handles, and various mining tools. 
In addition, the miners used mining explosive 
charges to assault barrages. 
• The impossibility of defusing tensions by dialogue 
with bellicose and heavily inebriated rioters. 209 
Political leadership was weak and inexperienced. The 
riots led to squabbles between the President and the ousted 
Premier, the latter complaining about his being the 
sacrificial lamb. Roman joined eventually the opposition 
camp. 
The wavering leadership prevented the Army from 
dispersing the rioters earlier. Perceiving a dispute between 
the President and the Premier, several senior officers were 
reluctant to involve their troops.210 In addition, they were 
not covered by any legal protection in case of loss of 
civilian lives. 211 
209 See Colonel Apostol-Ion Gheorghe, "Situatii de Criza ce Pot 
Afecta Securitatea Nationala" (graduation thesis, National Defence 
College, Bucharest, 1996). 
210 Discussion by the author with the then commanding general of 
the tank division located in Bucharest. 
211 With the benefit of hindsight, one might approve them. The then 
captain Vasile Gabor, commanding a counter-terrorist sub-unit of the 
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When the miners threatened to storm the Presidential 
Palace, the troops opened fire at the rioters, with 
expeditious results. The miners were not willing to confront 
lethal force. The communique on live ammunition being issued 
to the troops was enough of a deterrent. 
c. PRESENT CONDITIONS 
There are several laws approaching the topic of 
civilian disturbances, public order, and military response 
to domestic violence. 
Article 116 of the Constitution, paragraph 1, 
stipulates: 
The Armed Forces shall be exclusively subordinated to 
the will of the people, to guarantee the sovereignty, 
independence, and unity of the State, the Country's 
territorial integrity, and Constitutional democracy.212 
The National Security Strategy lists, under the heading 
"domestic risk factors," "the escalation of actions leading 
to a generalized crisis of authority by the institutions and 
leadership structures at national level. "213 
SPP, was sentenced to 8 years for manslaughter. Using a flare pistol, he 
killed an innocent bystander and a rioter at Victoria Square on 25 
September, while in the Government building which was set ablaze. See 
Vasile Surcel. 
212 See "Romania-Constitution," p. 1. 
213 The National Security Strategy was adopted by the SCND and 
submitted for Parliament's sanction. See "CSAT a Aprobat strategia de 
Securitate Nationalii a Romaniei," RomB.nia Libera, 20 August 1998, 
available [online]: <http://www.romanialibera.com/1POL/20c4csa.htm> [20 
August 1998], p. 3. 
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This subsection is part of a section entitled "Risk 
Factors for Romania's National Security," which concludes, 
in a rather ambiguous manner: "Means towards providing for 
Romania's national security are established in correlation 
with the national interest, resources, the evolution of 
economic and politico-military processes, as well as with 
the potential risk factors." 
Law 45 on the National Defence of Romania, sanctioned 
on January 7, 1994, stipulates at article 1: 
The National Defence shall comprise all the measures 
and activities adopted and carried out by the Romanian 
State in order to ensure national sovereignty, 
independence and unity of the State, the country's 
territorial integrity, and constitutional democracy. 
The law focuses on the means of providing for external 
defense and remains moot on the topic of ensuring 
constitutional democracy. 214 
Several operational plans were developed both by the 
Ministry of National Defence and by the Ministry of 
Interior, stipulating cooperation between the Army and the 
Gendarmerie in cases of civilian disturbances. 
Without the legal grounds for employing the Army in 
this contingency, the troops cannot train for such missions, 
nor is Parliament able to appropriate funds for training and 
214 "Law 45 on National Defence of Romania," Romanian Ministry of 
National Defence, available [online] at 
<http://mil.logicnet.ro/4l500000e.htm> [24 May 1998]. 
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equipment. The sole exception is the Military Police, but 
their range of mission includes only crimes and misdemeanors 
pertaining to military personnel, property, and 
installations. 
Figure 5 depicts the chain of command for crisis 
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Figure 5. The Chain of Command for Crisis Situations 
Threatening National Security 
Source: based upon Colonel Apostol-Ion Gheorghe, "Situatii de 
CrizS ce Pot Afecta Securitatea NationalS" (graduation 
thesis, National Defence College, Bucharest, 1996). 
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The diagram, empl'oyed in all contingency planning in 
cases of civilian violence, is rather close to wishful 
thinking, since no regulation statutory for the Ministry of 
National Defence stipulates the involvement of the Army in 
cases of civilian violence. 
So far, the legal framework is clear only for the 
Ministry of Interior. The Law on the Organization and 
Functioning of the Romanian Gendarmerie stipulates: 
Article 1. The Romanian Gendarmerie is the State 
specialized military institution, part of the Ministry 
of the Interior, which exercises, under the law, 
missions pertaining to the protection and defense, 
propriety of national value, to preserving and 
restoring public order, to preventing and fighting 
crime and other breeches of the law, to preventing and 
neutralizing terrorist activities on Romanian 
terri tory. 215 
The review of the legal framework directing military 
responses to civilian violence leads to the conclusion that 
it is flawed. The quelling of a civilian disturbance similar 
to the 1991 one is an uncertain enterprise, if the response 
is to be provided only by the police and Gendarmerie. The 
reaction by the Army in case of civilian violence is 
uncertain, since there is no statutory regulation compelling 
it to do so. 
215 "Lege privind Organizarea si Functionarea Jandarmeriei Romane," 




Romania, a fledgling democracy, is striving since 1990 
to create the stable foundations of a democratic polity. 
While the establishment of the legal framework has been 
largely completed, and three consecutive elections have 
taken place in conditions described as free and fair, it is 
premature to claim that the consolidation of democratic rule 
has been achieved. The threat of perennial transition is 
looming large over Romania's political life. 
The Armed Forces are one of the most stable and 
credible institutions so far, enjoying widespread support 
among the public. This perception is due to the fact that is 
was affected by political disputes way less than all other 
State institutions, and has been the only segment of the 
society consistently engaged in reforming itself. In 
Romania's quest for Euro-Atlantic integration, the Armed 
Forces were the single shinning point in an otherwise bleach 
picture. 
This status places the Armed Forces in an excellent 
position to protect the post-1989 democratic achievements. 
It has both the assets and the credibility to act 
efficiently to this end and the record proves that the 
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employment of the Armed forces has been critical in 
preventing the collapse of State institutions. 
Unfortunately, there is a definite hesitation both by 
the political factor and by the officer corps to acknowledge 
this role. This shyness is imputable to the last two cases 
of usage of the military instrument in domestic 
contingencies, specifically the 1989 Revolution and the 1991 
riots. 
The purpose of thesis was to demonstrate the necessity 
of accepting the military response to civilian violence as 
an instrument to protect democratic institutions. 
The case of the United States has been chosen to make 
this argument from several reasons: the proven stability of 
the American democratic way, envied and emulated worldwide, 
the successful record of military response to civilian 
violence, and the adoption of American patterns by the 
Romanian military in transition to a democratic model. 
The analysis of recent missions ascertained the 
increasing involvement of the U.S. Armed Forces in Military 
Operations Other Than War in the wake of the Cold War. It is 
true, to a certain extent this development has strained 
civil-military relations, political elites being more 
inclined to assign missions loathed by the top brass. 
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The investigation has discerned several developments 
related to an all-volunteer force, some of them of great 
interest for the Romanian military, contemplating the 
elimination of conscription. Of utmost interest is the 
potential alienation of the military from the values and 
concerns shared by the general public. Another risk, widely 
debated, is the changes in the officer corps ethos due to an 
exaggerated dedication to domestic operations, at the 
expense of "fighting America's wars." Due to specific 
circumstances, MOOTW affect military readiness. Moreover, 
military response to civilian disturbances, involving 
political considerations, requires different approaches to 
command and control, as well as specific training. 
Dismissing hastily these concerns would be erroneous. 
Nevertheless, the military missions are determined by the 
interaction of external and domestic factors, thus the 
missions can not be designed only by taking into account 
desires at the expense of facts. The issue is striking the 
right balance between external defense and MOOTW. 
In addition, the u.s. military has a long-standing 
record of involvement in civil disturbances, from the early 
days of the Republic. The circumstances led to the 
acceptance of the concept of a force sufficient to ensure 
that laws could be enforced throughout a wide and sparsely 
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settled territory, to take care of domestic violence or 
insurrection that a state's constituted authorities proved 
unable to handle, as well as to settle inter-state 
disputes. 216 
The distrust towards law enforcement by the military, 
as well as concern over military dictatorship, led to 
continuous refinements of the legal order regulating civil 
control over the military. The leading legal provision in 
this field is the Posse Cornmitatus Act of 1878, an outcome 
of the Reconstruction period. 
Both due to the American civil culture and to clear and 
comprehensive regulations, civil supremacy has never been 
put in question, at least not in cases of domestic 
operations. 217 
The American model of quelling civil violence is a 
three-tiered one, involving civilian law enforcement 
agencies, the National Guard, and the federal military 
(which might comprise the federal militia. i.e. the 
federalized National Guard). The classic three-tier model 
requires a paramilitary force as an intermediate level 
216 See Coakley, pp. 3-4. 
217 The MacArthur challenging President Truman's order as a 
Commander-in-Chief falls outside the scope of the present thesis. 
Suffice it to say that this case proved beyond the shadow of a doubt the 
resilience of the American model of civil-military relations. 
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between police and the Armed forces. The National Guard 
plays this role in the United States. 
The 1992 Los Angeles riots were selected as a case 
study for several reasons: 
• The events were contemporary with the most recent and 
relevant Romanian cases (taking place in 1989 and 
1991) . 
• The response involved all three tiers. 
• The riots were closer to urban guerilla than to classic 
riots (an attribute shared by the second phase of the 
1989 Revolution) . 
• A restrictive interpretation of legal regulations, 
specifically the Posse Commitatus Act, by the 
commanding officer, hindered the response by the 
federal military. 
• Lessons learned were incorporated in statutory 
documents. 
Currently, legal guidelines governing military response 
to civilian violence in the united States are provided by 
DoDD 3025.12 Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances 
(MACDIS) , issued on February 4, 1994, and DoDD 3025.15 
Military Assistance to Civil Authorities, issued on 
February, 18, 1997. The doctrine is stipulated by Domestic 
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Support Operations FM 100-19. They were investigated in 
order to draw lessons relevant to Romanian conditions. 
A brief review of civilian control over the military in 
Romania, as well of the Romanian officer corps, was deemed 
necessary to understand the feasibility of the employment of 
the military in quelling civilian violence. 
Romanian history presents some distinct contrasts to 
the American development, bearing among others, upon the 
civic culture and upon the military's role in the society. 
Due to specific circumstances, the Romanian democratic 
development started later than in the United States and it 
was arrested by half a century of dictatorship.218 The 1989 
brought a fresh start to the above-mentioned democratic 
development, and the end of the process is not in sight. 
The military has always been the bulwark of Romanian 
statehood, and thus the officer corps has been highly 
regarded in society. The officer corps has developed a sense 
of responsibility towards society, thus, its employment in 
cases of severe societal crises. Its acceptance of civil 
control was superseded only in situations when the regime 
had lost any semblance of legitimacy and the regime 
perpetuation jeopardized the very survival of the nation. 
218 Authoritarian Right-leaning regimes from 1938 to 1944 and 
Communist from 1947 to 1989. 
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The historic tradition, as well as a degree of autonomy 
under Communist rule, allowed the preservation of the 
officer corps' corporateness. 
The 1989 Revolution brought a major involvement by the 
Romanian military in civil violence. The military refused to 
play a repressive role in the service of a despised 
dictatorship and was instrumental in the eventual overthrow 
of the Communist regime. In the second phase, the military 
waged an urban guerrilla, for which it was ill suited and 
thus took heavy casualties. Nevertheless, the military was 
critical to the survival of the new democratic achievements. 
The Revolution brought~ among other developments, a 
discernible, and to a certain extent understandable, 
reluctance towards using the Armed Forces in cases of civil 
violence. The post-1989 course of events led initially to 
the development of a two-their response, involving police 
and the Gendarmerie, a paramilitary force under the Ministry 
of Interior. 
The 1991 riots proved the necessity of involving the 
Armed Forces in suppressing violent attacks on the State 
institutions. This was not yet acknowledged by the adoption 
of statutory regulations to guide the employment of the 
military in quelling civil disturbances. Training was not 
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adapted to specific circumstances imposed by this type of 
contingency. 
The examination of the legal framework showed its sheer 
inadequacy. Thus, the occurrence of violent riots like the 
1991 put under question the preparedness of the State 
response and subsequently the very survival of its 
democratic institutions in the tormented transition 
confronting nowadays Romania. 
The thesis advocates the adoption of clearly defined 
regulation, as well as of operational plans to deal in an 
effective fashion with civilian violence. The American 
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